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AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF SOURCING 







The purpose of this study is to explore whether and how the United States Air 
Force (USAF) can improve efficiency in sourcing knowledge-based services by 
instituting for-profit sector best practices in strategic sourcing. Knowledge-based 
services are a major part of the total services acquired by the Department of 
Defense (DoD); however, the DoD is currently unable to determine how much 
savings can be attained in this area. Despite evolving DoD policies, there is 
currently no cost-saving/avoidance framework or set of best practices for 
knowledge-based service contracts. In this study, we interviewed procurement 
professionals from the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, analyzed USAF 
knowledge-based service contracts, and conducted a spend analysis on the 
USAF FY2010 spend data to identify for-profit best practices to aid the USAF in 
realizing cost savings when purchasing knowledge-based services. The findings 
of this research suggest that the USAF is currently not utilizing the for-profit best 
practices to their fullest potential. This study provides recommendations for the 
USAF and DoD to realize additional cost savings in the purchasing of knowledge-
based services. Additionally, the research serves as a pilot for future study on 
identifying for-profit sector best practices in the sourcing of knowledge-based 
services. 
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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is facing a new 
government-wide mandate for cost savings due to looming sequestration, 
increased public scrutiny, and a worldwide economic crunch.  A 2006 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that the DoD, as the 
largest buyer of services in the federal government, “must maximize its return on 
investment and provide the warfighter with needed capabilities and support at the 
best value for the taxpayer” (p. 1).  Additionally, one of the fundamental premises 
of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) system is the efficient use of public 
resources (FAR, 2013a).  These premises create a challenge for the acquisition 
workforce within the DoD to sustain quality supplies and services with an 
additional focus on mitigating cost. 
A benchmarking research survey showed that purchasing services is more 
difficult than purchasing goods (Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 2007).  In service 
contracts, it is difficult to define the service level required and to write precise 
statements of work, whereas it is relatively easy to write specifications for 
manufactured goods (Ellram et al., 2007).  There is a general belief that service 
quality and performance are not as easy to measure and specify objectively as 
product quality and performance due to a service’s intangibility, heterogeneity, 
perishability, and inseparability (Ellram et al., 2007).  Because the trend of 
purchasing services is on the rise, there are opportunities for organizations to 
improve their purchasing of services (Ellram et al., 2007).  However, the requisite 
infrastructure in terms of processes and human resources involved in service 
purchasing is not commensurate with the growth of service purchasing (Ellram et 
al., 2007). 
The DoD, like all other organizations, has focused primarily on the cost 
savings in acquiring supplies by using strategic sourcing processes (see Figure 
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1; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2005).  According to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB; 2005), “strategic sourcing is the 
collaborative and structured process of critically analyzing an organization’s 
spending and using this information to make business decisions about acquiring 
commodities and services more effectively and efficiently” (p. 1).  One for-profit 
sector firm defined strategic sourcing as “the process of evaluating, selecting, 
and aligning suppliers or consortiums of suppliers to achieve operational 
improvements in support of an organization’s strategic goals” (Duffie & Koester, 
2005, p. 3).  The for-profit sector offers multiple definitions of strategic sourcing, 
depending on the strategies used for that respective corporation.  Despite these 
multiple definitions, both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors focus first on 
spend analysis and then leverage a respective area that will help to cut costs 
while still providing quality products and services.  
Although the for-profit sector has recognized the benefits of strategic 
sourcing as far back as the 1970s, the DoD continues to struggle with 
implementing its own agency-wide framework for strategic sourcing (GAO, 
2012c).  The GAO released a study in 2002 conducted on six leading companies 
that had instituted a strategic approach to the acquisition of services. Brunswick, 
Dun & Bradstreet, Electronic Data Systems, ExxonMobil, Hasbro, and Merrill 
Lynch & Company successfully reengineered their business practices for 
acquiring services (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2002).  As a result, the 
organizations netted cost savings as high as 15% while maintaining or even 
improving service levels (GAO, 2002).  
The DoD has also implemented a small number of commodity councils for 
sourcing goods strategically; however, the DoD is finding it difficult to strategically 
source services due to their varying nature (Weigelt, 2012).  Over the past few 
decades, the DoD has focused on promoting efficiencies in the acquisition of 
products but is now looking at gaining efficiencies in service contracts as well, 
because more than half of all contract spending involves services.  A variety of 
factors contributes to the relative neglect of purchasing professionally managed 
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services (Ellram et al., 2007).  These factors include a lack of resources and 
information technology, lack of support-improved service purchasing, and a lack 
of understanding of cost structure and when to outsource (Ellram et al., 2007).  
Moreover, due to the peculiar nature of services, it is difficult to develop service 
specifications, evaluate services in advance, and quantify services in cost; 
hence, it is difficult to put a price on services (van der Valk & Rozemeijer, 2009).  
Coupled with fragmented service spending and a growing service supply base, 
the results of poor service purchasing management can have harmful effects on 
the organization’s performance (Ellram et al., 2007).  
Many companies buy services indiscriminately because they consider 
these services to be non-strategic (van der Valk & Rozemeijer, 2009).  Even if a 
company were to regard a service as critical or strategic in nature, non-
procurement people, such as marketers and logisticians, are still involved in the 
service’s procurement (van der Valk & Rozemeijer, 2009).  A study of 158 
companies showed that purchasing departments were involved in only 41% of 
service purchases, which highlights the neglect of realizing the complexity of 
purchasing services (Bales & Fearon, 1995).  
 
Figure 1.  DoD-Wide Strategic Sourcing Program Concept of Operations 
(From DPAP, 2005) 
A 2009 GAO report showed that DoD obligations for service contracts 
doubled between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY2008, from $92 billion to $200 
billion (see Figure 2).  However, GAO is very critical about DoD’s management of 
services acquisition.  According to a 2007 report, “the DoD does not know how 
well its service acquisition processes are working … and whether it is obtaining 
 4 
the services that it needs while protecting the DoD’s and the taxpayer’s interests” 
(2007a, p. 1).  Additionally, GAO also criticized DoD for the lack of key elements 
at the strategic and transactional levels in managing its processes for 
administering service acquisitions (2007b). 
 
Figure 2.  Increase in Obligation Toward Service Contract (After GAO, 2009b) 
The increased reliance on service contracts amplified the risk of hiring 
contractors to fill inherently governmental functions (GAO, 2011b).  As per FAR 
2.1 (2013b), “inherently governmental functions means, as a matter of policy, a 
function that is so intimately related to public interest as to mandate performance 
by Government employees.”  Examples of inherently governmental functions in 
contracting include contract awards, contract administration, contract termination, 
and participation of a contractor as a voting member on a source selection board 
(FAR, 2013b).  When the government hires contractors to fill inherently 
governmental services, it places contractors in a position to inappropriately 
influence decisions on government authority, control, and accountability (GAO, 
2011b).  A shrinking acquisition workforce and increased spending on services 
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“Inspectors General … identified numerous instances of weak business practices—
poorly defined requirements, inadequate competition, insufficient guidance and 
leadership, inadequate monitoring of contractor performance, and inappropriate 
uses of other agencies’ contracts and contracting services” (2007b, p. 2). 
Since the economic crisis in 2008–2009, firms seeking to transform their 
sourcing strategies often have limited resources (Monczka & Petersen, 2011).  It 
is during the slow economic recovery that firms must be ever vigilant in finding 
efficiencies in strategic sourcing. Monczka and Petersen (2011) claimed that 
firms must set clear goals, lock in resources, set transformation priorities, and 
then follow through with the transformation.  The continuing economic crunch 
and the engagement of U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the 
DoD to begin a comprehensive effort to increase efficiencies, reduce overhead 
costs, and eliminate redundant functions in order to improve the effectiveness of 
the DoD enterprise.  This effort focused on reprioritizing how the DoD can use 
resources to more effectively support and sustain the force and, more 
importantly, the warfighter (DoD, 2010). Based on Defense Secretary Robert M. 
Gates’ initiatives of efficiency improvement in the Pentagon, then–Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) 
Ashton Carter (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [OUSD], 2010a) 
unveiled the memorandum Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending to acquisition professionals.  
The objective of the  memorandum was “to deliver war fighting capabilities 
needed within the constraints of declining defense budget by achieving better 
buying power for the warfighter and the tax payer” (DoD, 2013).  In the 
memorandum, Carter wrote:  
We have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical goods and 
services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have ever-
increasing budgets to pay for them.  We must therefore strive to achieve 
what economists call productivity growth; in simple terms, to DO MORE 
WITHOUT MORE. (OUSD, 2010a)  
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Subsequently, Frank Kendall, the new USD(AT&L), issued Better Buying 
Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending (Kendall, 2012).  Kendall (2012) stressed “improved tradecraft 
in acquisition of services” as one of the seven major categories of initiatives 
under the Better Buying Power 2.0. Kendall (n.d.), during his speech at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that there are great 
opportunities for efficiencies in the acquisition of services because the DoD is 
spending more than half of its budget on services.  Kendall (n.d.) also mentioned 
that all six basic types of services (i.e., knowledge-based services, facilities-
related services, medical services, equipment-related services, electronic and 
communication services, and transportation services) have their own peculiar 
characteristics and best practices to achieve efficiencies. 
Although knowledge-based services are only one of the six types of 
services, they account for a major portion of service spending and provide a 
substantial opportunity for cost savings.  This is evident from the fact that DoD 
spending on knowledge-based services is steadily increasing.  Between FY2005 
and FY2011, the DoD increased the use of knowledge-based services from 
$28.3 billion to $45.2 billion (DPAP, 2012; GAO, 2007a).  Knowledge-based 
services constitute a vast portion within professional and management services 
(PAMS), as categorized by the CSIS (Berteau, Ben-Ari, Sanders, Morrow, & 
Ellman, 2012).  As shown in Figure 3, spending on professional and 
management services also increased from $24 billion in 2000 to $61 billion in 
2011, which equates to a growth of 8.9% per year (Berteau et al., 2012).  Figure 
3 also shows that from 2003 to 2011, the DoD spent more dollars on professional 
and management services than on any other category (Berteau et al., 2012).  
The United States Air Force (USAF) spend data of FY2010 also showed an 
obligation of $9.7 billion on knowledge-based services, which is 37.82% of total 
spending on acquisition of services (Federal Procurement Data System–Next 




Figure 3.  Defense Service Contract Spending by Service Area based on 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) (From Berteau et al., 2012)  
During this time of financial constraints, the DoD must use the obligated 
dollars in the most efficient manner.  Due to the peculiar characteristics of the 
services, the DoD is unable to quantify the output of services in terms of their 
contribution to the overall mission.  Knowledge-based services are a major part 
of the total services acquired by the DoD; however, the DoD is currently unable 
to determine how much savings can be attained in this area.  Despite evolving 
DoD policies, there is currently no cost-saving/avoidance framework or set of 
best practices for knowledge-based service contracts. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to explore whether and how the USAF can 
improve efficiency in sourcing knowledge-based services by instituting 
commercial best practices in strategic sourcing. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this research, we attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the relevant tenets of strategic sourcing? 
2. What are commercial best practices in sourcing knowledge-
based services? 
3. What are the constraints, if any, of applying the commercial 
best practices in the USAF context? 
4. What are the different types of knowledge-based services 
being procured?  How much money is spent on these 
services, with how many different contractors, from how 
many different buying offices, and through how many 
different contract actions?  How many are with small 
businesses?  How many are sole source?  What is the 
composition by contract type? 
5. What are the different outcomes/deliverables of contracted 
knowledge-based services (e.g., technical reports, research, 
staff support labor, education, training, analysis, advice, 
briefings, white papers)? 
6. Of the different outcomes of knowledge-based services, 
what are the major cost drivers (e.g., time, labor rates, skills, 
travel) of each by type?  How are costs minimized? 
7. Can those cost drivers be better managed to increase 
efficiency without compromising effectiveness?  If so, how? 
8. By applying commercial best practices and original ideas, 
how much cost could be saved or avoided? 
D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The overall intent of this research is to improve the efficiency of sourcing 
knowledge-based services within the USAF.  The literature review and data 
analysis in this research will help in understanding and analyzing the best 
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practices that the USAF can adopt in sourcing knowledge-based services in the 
most cost-effective and efficient manner.  Based on our findings, we can provide 
recommendations that could potentially improve the sourcing of knowledge-
based services in the USAF.  This study also establishes a framework for future 
studies across all other components of the DoD. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The sample size we used in the spend analysis is only a small percentage 
of knowledge-based services being acquired by the USAF in terms of the 
categories of services and the number of contracts; therefore, there may be 
some cost drivers and inefficiencies that remain unexplored.  Moreover, there are 
for-profit sector best practices that the DoD cannot implement due to government 
regulations and statutory requirements. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
There are five chapters in the report. Chapter I includes background 
information, the purpose and objectives of the study, research questions, benefits 
and limitations, and the research methodology.  Chapter II includes the literature 
review related to academic theories of knowledge management and knowledge 
flow, strategic sourcing, and the DoD’s application of strategic sourcing.  In 
Chapter III, we discuss the methodology used for the collection of the data.  
Chapter IV is the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data.  Finally, in 
Chapter V, we offer conclusions, recommendations, limitations of the study, and 
future research directions. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology includes a spend analysis of USAF 
knowledge-based service contracts for FY2010 as well as an analysis of the 
latest for-profit sector best practices for sourcing services.  Based on a literature 
review and an analysis of spend data, we formulated a questionnaire to gather 
information to aid in answering the research questions.  We analyzed data 
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qualitatively and quantitatively to draw conclusions about inefficiencies in the 
USAFs sourcing of knowledge-based services.  We developed research 
objectives to identify the ways by which the USAF can improve its efficiency of 
sourcing knowledge-based services by instituting for-profit sector best practices 
and tenets of strategic sourcing.  To achieve our research objectives 
systematically, we approached the research in the following manner: 
1. identify knowledge-based services through spend analysis; 
2. identify best practices for sourcing knowledge-based services in the 
corporate and government sectors; and 
3. provide recommendations on sourcing procedures of knowledge-




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the literature on relevant topics 
pertaining to the strategic sourcing of services.  This chapter begins by 
highlighting the characteristics of services, workforce issues, and inherently 
governmental functions as they relate to services, followed by an overview of 
knowledge-based services.  This chapter concludes by describing knowledge 
management theories and the basic history, tenets, and current DoD initiatives of 
strategic sourcing. 
B. SERVICES 
Between FY2005 and FY2011, the DoD increased the use of knowledge-
based services from $28.3 billion to $45.2 billion (DPAP, 2012; GAO, 2007a).  
This increased reliance on service contracts has amplified the risk of hiring 
contractors to fill inherently governmental services (GAO, 2011b).  When the 
government hires contractors to fill inherently governmental services, it places 
contractors in a position to inappropriately influence decisions on government 
authority, control, and accountability (GAO, 2011b).  A lack of management 
oversight due to increased acquisition spending and a reduction in the size of the 
acquisition workforce compounded this risk (GAO, 2007b).  Despite evolving 
DoD policies, there is currently no approved cost-saving/avoidance framework or 
set of best practices that can be applied to sourcing knowledge-based services. 
1. Characteristics 
Services and commodities both aim to meet a need, provide functionality 
and value for the customer, and vie for a place in the competitive market 
(Axelsson & Wynstra, 2002).  Services are often difficult to define, but most 
definitions tend to include the properties of intangibility and simultaneous 
consumption (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2008). Lovelock and Wirtz (2007) 
defined services as 
 12 
economic activities offered by one party to another, most commonly 
employing time-based performances to bring about desired results 
in recipients themselves or in objects or other assets for which 
purchasers have responsibility. In exchange for their money, time, 
and effort, service customers expect to obtain value from access to 
goods, labor, professional skills, facilities, networks, and systems; 
but they do not normally take ownership of any of the physical 
elements involved. (p. 15) 
Services require some degree of customer participation; suppliers and 
customers consume them simultaneously; and they are perishable, intangible, 
and often classified as heterogeneous (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2008).  
Because services differ by such things as complexity, duration, location, and 
price, they often make it difficult for suppliers to understand the market. Lovelock 
and Wirtz (2007) discussed eight characteristic that suppliers face: 
 Most service products cannot be inventoried. 
 Intangible elements usually dominate value creation. 
 Services are often difficult to visualize and understand. 
 Customers may be involved in co-production. 
 People may be part of the service experience. 
 Operational inputs and outputs tend to vary more widely. 
 The time factor often assumes great importance. 
 Distribution may take place through nonphysical channels. 
Unlike commodities, services cannot be stored unless previously recorded 
electronically or physically for later use (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  Like unused 
manufacturing space waiting to produce commodities, services may also have 
unused capacity (e.g., facilities, equipment, labor) in anticipation for services not 
rendered (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  Every time the USAF sends an empty C5, 
C130, or C17 cargo plane in and out of Afghanistan, it experiences lost 
opportunities to retrograde unneeded or broken equipment.  Over- or 
underutilization of capacity is very challenging for managers due to customer 
variations that offer no inventory to absorb these lost opportunities (Fitzsimmons 
& Fitzsimmons, 2008).  This unused capacity causes loss of time and money. 
Likewise, overcapacity can forgo profit.   
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Customers also face the intangibility issue because they cannot see the 
service that they are purchasing.  These behind-the-scene processes, internet-
based transactions, and service personnel attitudes and expertise make it difficult 
for customers to see where the greatest value or performance lies (Lovelock & 
Wirtz, 2007).  There are also services that contain both intangible services and 
commodities, like a mechanic who rebuilds parts for resale.  Lovelock and Wirtz 
(2007) presented an economic model that places these types of services into the 
service category if more than half of the value comes from intangible services. 
Another issue with services is that they are not always easy to envision 
and comprehend.  Often, first-time customers lack the knowledge or insight to 
anticipate the outcome of the service—such as the USAF contracting with a 
major company to provide wing and fuselage testing of aircraft—thus making it 
difficult to trust the provider (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  The customer must rely on 
the provider’s brand name or on reviews from repeat customers to make an 
informed decision.  Service providers must work hard to build trust with the 
customer prior to executing the service and then follow up after completing the 
service to build customer confidence (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007). 
Many customers co-produce the service process every day and do not 
even realize it.  Military personnel participate in such things as providing food 
services at a dining facility, meeting with consultants to discuss cost-savings 
measures, or applying themselves in their education (Fitzsimmons & 
Fitzsimmons, 2008).  Likewise, many businesses are eliminating the customer 
from the service process, such as banks who encourage the use of online 
banking, businesses that encourage online shopping instead of actually going to 
the physical location, or the military, which allows personnel to conduct self-
service moves to another geographic location and file travel claims online 
(Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2008).  Service providers must continually gather 
feedback from customers to determine whether customers value self-serve 
technologies (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  Customers who are actively involved in 
the service process can help the service provider make better-informed 
decisions. 
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Additionally, employees who are part of the service provided play an 
important role in securing future business for the service provider.  Customers 
value the employees by their attire, availability, attitude, and interpersonal skills 
(Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  Customers expect fair treatment, and businesses can 
ensure that this happens by properly training employees on how to provide the 
service.  It is vital for management to keep their employees happy so that, in turn, 
the employees can make the customer happy.  Service providers must also keep 
in mind that other customers can also influence future opportunities, so they must 
control the mixture of customers that they have in their facility at one time 
(Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007). 
Because service providers outsource various aspects of a service, it is 
important for service providers to ensure that they maintain a good relationship 
with the supplier (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  Outsourcing does not allow 
managers to monitor every service they provide, so they must rely on customer 
feedback to ensure employee compliance (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2008).  
Additionally, many service providers use standardized procedures and rigorous 
service management procedures and provide additional employee training for 
service recovery procedures to combat service quality problems (Lovelock & 
Wirtz, 2007). 
In today’s busy world, customers look for services that fit their schedules. 
Because most people work during the day, many service providers have adjusted 
their hours (often 24/7) to meet customer demands (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  
Additionally, because time is precious, customers also value the amount of time 
between their request for service and the time that the provider completes the 
service (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007).  Unlike commodities, services operate in an 
open system, meaning that they rely totally on the customer wait time instead of 
on physical inventory (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2008).  Suppliers must 
balance customer wait time against service capacity, utilization, and idle time 
(Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2008).   
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Finally, the Internet creates instant or supplementary services (Lovelock & 
Wirtz, 2007).  Services such as the sale of insurance or education delivered 
online constitute instant services, whereas services such as the online 
purchasing of commodities or airline tickets are supplemental services to the 
actual outcome of receiving the goods or traveling in the airplane (Lovelock & 
Wirtz, 2007).  Service providers must continually gather feedback from 
customers to determine whether customers value self-serve technologies 
(Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007). 
Although these many challenges of services may seem trivial to the 
customer, they have the potential to generate cost savings for the supplier if 
marketed appropriately.  Suppliers can pass this gained efficiency on to the 
customer by providing a better service or a more quality product.  This gained 
efficiency can only be the result of properly managing the service process. 
2. Inherently Governmental Functions 
The increased use of contractors to provide services for the government 
has amplified the risk of hiring personnel to fill inherently governmental positions.  
When the government hires contractors to fill inherently governmental services, it 
places contractors in a position to inappropriately influence decisions on 
government authority, control, and accountability (GAO, 2011b).  In 2008, 
Congress mandated that the DoD conduct an annual review and document all 
contractors related to service contracts (GAO, 2012b).  The Army developed a 
database to conduct the inventory and was the first department to comply with 
the reporting requirement.  Despite Congress mandating changes to the 
reporting requirements, the DoD indicated that it would not have an enterprise-
wide system until 2016 (GAO, 2012b).  According to the GAO (2012b), in 2009, 
the Army and the USAF had a combined 2,026 violations of contractors 
performing inherently governmental functions.  The same report indicated that 
eight of 12 sample contracts reviewed by the GAO were still in violation of the 
congressional mandate (GAO, 2012b).  The GAO attributed these poor results to 
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unclear lines of accountability and responsibility for conducting contractor 
reviews, as well as not addressing contracts where contractors were performing 
inherently governmental functions (GAO, 2012b).  The Army also voiced its 
concerns about the DoD’s freeze on hiring DoD civilians to replace those 
contractors who are filling inherently governmental positions at the 2010 levels as 
another deterrent to replace contractors currently filling positions (GAO, 2012b).  
FAR 2.101 defines inherently governmental functions as the following: 
Inherently governmental function”means, as a matter of policy, a 
function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to 
mandate performance by Government employees.  This definition 
is a policy determination, not a legal determination.  An inherently 
governmental function includes activities that require either the 
exercise of discretion in applying Government authority, or the 
making of value judgments in making decisions for the 
Government. (FAR, 2012a) 
In addition, FAR 7.503 (2012c) lists multiple examples of inherently and 
non-inherently governmental functions to aid the departments in determining 
whether a contractor is performing an inherently governmental function.  
Additionally, FAR 37.114 provides further parameters to ensure that contractors 
do not fill inherently governmental positions (FAR, 2012a).  The GAO 
recommended that the DoD implement clear guidance on the reporting process 
and address personnel currently filling inherently governmental positions (GAO, 
2012b).  It also recommended that the DoD set target dates for their departments 
to monitor compliance in reporting requirements, as well as to ensure that the 
Army and the USAF remove contractors currently filling inherently governmental 
positions (GAO, 2012b).   
3. Workforce Issues 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) under Public Law 101–510 to improve the acquisition 
workforce (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], n.d.-a).  This act required that 
the DAU provide training for the DoD and gave the DoD leadership authority to 
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elect acquisition positions, set qualification standards, and create training and 
certification policies to train its acquisition workforce (GAO, 2011a).  In 1992, the 
Defense Authorization Act set out to create the Acquisition Corps and enhance 
the acquisition workforce through education, training, and work experience (DAU, 
n.d.-a.).  The DoD modified the DAWIA numerous times to stay relevant with the 
changing processes and spending trends.  The DAWIA is the foundation and 
guide for all DoD acquisition workforce training and certification.  Despite 
Congress’ vision for a trained workforce, severe downsizing at the end of the 
Cold War occurred, and the DoD lost institutional knowledge. 
In 2001, the defense acquisition workforce decreased by about half the 
post–Cold War levels; however, the contracting workload increased by 12% 
(GAO, 2001a).  This decline in human resources, compounded by the increased 
use of service contracts and complex contracts, put agencies at risk for not 
having the right people with appropriate skills to manage these purchases (GAO, 
2001b).  The downsizing of the acquisition workforce eliminated much of the 
requisite knowledge of the market, industry trends, the ability to prepare clear 
statements of work (SOWs), technical abilities, and the capacity to manage 
contracts (GAO, 2006).  Additional stress on the acquisition workforce resulted 
from increased security measures required after 9/11, as well as the increased 
use of service contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq (GAO, 2006).  The DoD 
acknowledged its shortfalls and created a two-year plan to address the 
unbalanced and inexperienced acquisition workforce (GAO, 2006).  The plan 
outlined an acquisition workforce competency model, generated policy changes 
on the management of contractors supporting contingency operations, and 
developed an integrated assessment of how to acquire services (GAO, 2007b). 
In 2010, the GAO assessed the proficiency of the DoD’s training and 
certification program and found that its program adequately provided effective 
training with room for improvement (GAO, 2011a).  Despite the adequate training 
program, the GAO recommended that the DoD develop a means of continuously 
tracking the strength and skills of the acquisition workforce (GAO, 2011a).  The 
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GAO also recommended that the DoD establish a means of identifying 
acquisition-related personnel who require DAWIA training due to their 
involvement in the procurement process (GAO, 2011a). 
4. Knowledge-based Services 
The DoD currently spends more on knowledge-based services than on 
major weapons systems (Sablan, 2011).  Despite the increased use of 
knowledge-based service contracts in the last decade, the DoD has done little to 
address inefficiencies in the procurement of knowledge-based services.  The for-
profit sector also increased its spending on “talented (and highly paid) engineers, 
salespeople, scientists, and other professionals” (Dewhurst, Ellsworth, & 
Hancock, 2013, p. 60).  The increased use of knowledge-based services is 
causing a shortage of knowledge workers.  Research conducted by McKinsey 
Global Institute predicted a shortage of 13% of demand by 2020 (Dewhurst et al., 
2013).  If the predicted shortage of knowledge-based workers is true, then the 
DoD will also face sourcing issues. 
Knowledge-based services within the DoD are defined by the DAU as 
“sources to support or improve organizational policy development, decision-
making, management and administration, program and/or project management 
and administration, or research and development (R&D) activities” (DAU, n.d.-b).  
The DoD further broke these services into seven categories used to help develop 
and manage spend data: 
 Engineering Management Services: contractual services such as 
systems engineering, specifications development, technical 
assistance, engineering and technical services, simulations, and 
professional services and technology sharing. 
 Program Management Services: services related to research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) management and 
support, special studies and analysis, operations research, policy 
review and development, program evaluation, program 
management/support, program review/development, and 
management services/contract and procurement. 
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 Logistics Management Services: support of logistics involving the 
integration of information, transportation, inventory, warehousing, 
material handling, and packaging, and occasionally security. 
 Management Support Services: contractual services that provide 
assistance or advice for the efficient and effective management and 
operation of an organization. 
 Administrative and Other Services: material management, courier 
and messenger support, transcription, mailing and distribution, 
library services, word processing and typing, stenography, and 
administrative technical support for conferences and training 
programs. 
 Professional Services: contracted services that provide organized, 
analytical evaluations in support of policy review and development, 
program management support, operations research, simulation 
services, specifications development, systems engineering, 
analyses, or evaluations. 
 Education and Training: contracted services that provide education 
and training assistance (DAU, n.d.-b.). 
The DAU referred to the outcomes provided by these services as 
“information, advice, opinions, alternatives, analysis, evaluations, 
recommendations, training, and the day-to-day aid of support personnel needed 
for the successful performance of ongoing Federal operations” (DAU, n.d.-b.).  In 
2010, the DoD categorized knowledge-based services into the previously 
mentioned seven categories, spread throughout 25 sub-categories containing 
218 product service codes (PSCs; OUSD, 2010b).  Table 1 provides an example 
of knowledge-based services within each of the seven categories. 
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Although many for-profit sector firms have various ways of categorizing 
services, there is not a universal standard for for-profit sector firms to follow.  The 
for-profit sector also has many different meanings for what makes up knowledge-
based services. Javalgi, Joseph, and LaRosa (2007) defined knowledge-based 
services as “those which are relatively intensive in their inputs of human capital 
(e.g., people know-how skills) and information and communications technologies” 
(p. 371).  The authors also stated that “knowledge-based services possess 
additional unique characteristics such as high customization, complexity, risk and 
uncertainty” (Javalgi et al., 2007, p. 371).  Much like the DAU, Javalgi et al. 
(2007) categorized knowledge-based services as “management and engineering 
consulting, information technology and training services, architectural services, 
and educational services” (p. 371).  Debely, Dubosson, and Fragniere (2008) 
stated that “knowledge-based services are relying on people who use their heads 
more than their hands to produce value” (p. 169).  The authors also considered 
knowledge-based services as “all services delivered by highly educated and 
informed employees responding to specific diagnosed customer demands by 
offering and delivering customized value-added solutions and relations” (Debely 
et al., 2008, p. 170). 
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C. THEORIES 
The definition of theory depends on the field of study. John Wacker (1998) 
presented three different issues raised by practitioners of theory.  Some 
researchers believe a theory to be abstract and without a need for testing or 
application (Wacker, 1998).  Other researchers believe a theory to be good only 
if investigated through trial and error (Wacker, 1998).  Finally, a good theory must 
show the measurements used to validate testing outcomes (Wacker, 1998).  
According to Whetten (1989), a good theory must contain the questions of what, 
how, why, and the combination of who, where, and when.  
Whetten (1989) suggested that a good theory begins by establishing the 
factors needed to explain “what” a researcher is exploring.  He discussed the 
importance of utilizing only relevant factors and eliminating factors that contribute 
little benefit (Whetten, 1989).  Exploring irrelevant factors can be cumbersome 
and can often prolong or even discredit the research project.  After determining 
the relevant factors, the researcher needs to link the relevant factors and identify 
“how” they relate to one another (Whetten, 1989).  Linking the relevant factors 
establishes patterns and can often show causality (Whetten, 1989).  Whetten 
(1989) joined the “what” and “how” to develop the underlying subject of the 
theory.  This step of theory development can help to eliminate irrelevant factors.  
Once the relationships develop between “what” and “how,” Whetten (1989) 
addressed the question, why would others render credibility to the research?  To 
answer the “why” of a good theory, Whetten (1989) explored the conditions set 
by human nature, organizations, and processes.  He used these conditions to 
establish reasonableness of the proposed concept (Whetten, 1989).  From the 
combination of the “what,” “how,” and “why” emerges a modest theory ready for 
exploration.  It is through the testing of the “what,” “how,” and “why” that the final 
stage of “who,” “where,” and “when” is revealed (Whetten, 1989).  The “who,” 
“where,” and “when” stages establish limitations and the range of a good theory 
(Whetten, 1989).  Although boundaries can sometimes limit the research, 
Whetten (1989) depicted the importance of exploring the effects of time and 
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context relating to people and events.  By addressing time and context, a 
researcher can ensure that he or she includes all of the respective geographic 
locations, as well as the diverse amount of experience throughout the world.  
Without theories in the business world, many firms have nothing to base 
decisions on other than what they personally observe within their realm of 
influence. 
Since 2001, the DoD has increased the use of service contracts due to the 
support of the Global War on Terrorism, government policy, and conditions 
favoring the use of for-profit sector resources (GAO, 2007c).  Specifically, 
between FY2005 and FY2011, the DoD increased the use of knowledge-based 
services from $28.3 billion to $45.2 billion (DPAP, 2012; GAO, 2007a).  Because 
the DoD is essentially buying knowledge in seeking efficiencies, it is important to 
discuss knowledge management and knowledge flow theory to highlight potential 
issues in obtaining, storing, or diffusing knowledge within an organization.  
1. Knowledge Management 
According to Becerra-Fernandez and Leidner (2008), knowledge 
management (KM) “has been viewed as an increasingly important field of study 
that promotes the creation, capture, sharing, and application of an organization’s 
knowledge” (pp. 3–4).  The authors defined KM as “performing the activities 
involved in discovering, capturing, sharing, and applying knowledge so as to 
enhance, in a cost-effective fashion, the impact of knowledge on the unit’s goal 
achievement” (Becerra-Fernandez & Leidner, 2008, p. 6).  Effective knowledge 
management within an organization can lead to a competitive advantage.  A 
recent study conducted by California State University revealed that on average, 
companies that effectively managed their knowledge achieved a 5% increase in 
their return on sales, return on assets, operating income to assets, and operating 
income to sales (Holsapple & Wu, 2011).  Benefits of effective KM include 
superior knowledge acquisition, superior storage and retrieval, superior sharing 
and dissemination, and superior decision-making (Holsapplle & Wu, 2011).  
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Unlike a few decades ago, when employees stayed at a company for their 
entire career, most employees today stay an average of 4.4 years at one job, 
which equates to about 15–20 moves over the course of an employee’s career 
(Meister, 2012).  The increased turnover in employees has caused firms to 
continuously figure out ways to capture knowledge from their employees, 
suppliers, and purchasers to obtain a competitive advantage.  For many 
employers, waiting until an employee leaves the firm to realize that the firm never 
captured key knowledge can cause a firm to lose money, time, and possibly its 
competitive advantage. 
For employers to capture knowledge from their employees, they must 
understand the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge.  Explicit 
knowledge is information and knowledge easily captured in some sort of trade 
secret, patent, copyright, process, written instructions, or documents (Nissen, 
2006).  Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge specific to an 
organization and gained through experience (Nissen, 2006).  The problem with 
tacit knowledge is that it does not flow freely, it is difficult to transfer, it is not 
easily understood by others, and it is often taken for granted until it is gone 
(Nissen, 2006).  
The first step for an organization that seeks to improve KM is to determine 
what type of knowledge they need to capture and how they are going to capture 
it.  According to Silvi and Cuganesan (2006), an organization must identify 
“knowledge specificity and the knowledge type (tacit versus explicit)” in order to 
understand which resources to focus on when seeking out knowledge as a 
competitive advantage (p. 312).  After examining other cost drivers within an 
organization, management can identify what activities an organization can 
leverage and how knowledge resources should be used (Silvi & Cuganesan, 




Figure 4.  Cost-Knowledge Management Framework 
(From Silvi & Cuganesan, 2006) 
Additionally, managers must consider how to collect the knowledge within 
the organization.  Although internal sources of knowledge are pivotal in 
transferring business-level knowledge to executive level understanding, the 
internal sources can also be biased (Henderson et al., 2001).  External sources 
of knowledge collectors can often provide an objective level of expertise 
contributing to the deep and complex capturing of knowledge (Henderson, 
Sussman, & Thomas, 2001).  
If a firm manages to collect knowledge and information from its 
employees, the firm then faces the challenge of how to manage and store that 
knowledge.  According to Alavi & Leidner, “The success of a knowledge 
management system, partially depends on the extent of use, which itself may be 
tied to system quality, information quality, and usefulness” (2001, p. 130).  
Laberta (2010) described some of the general types of information management 
systems that include the following: 
 data-processing systems,  
 management information systems,  
 25 
 decision support systems,  
 executive information systems,  
 expert systems, and 
 intelligent systems.  
Examples of such information management systems include NetSuite 
information management software, cash registers, inventory control systems, 
online help systems, programs that can act on behalf of humans, and Microsoft 
Access database software.  
The DoD has several information technology (IT) systems that contain 
vast amounts of information made available for everyday use and decision-
making.  DoD contracting officers use the DAU, DPAP, Federal Business 
Opportunities (FBO), Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), Electronic 
Document Access (EDA), Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Retrieval (DAMIR), and their own internal SharePoint websites, just to name a 
few.  Contracting officers use these websites to track training, post policy and 
regulations, solicit proposals and bids, award contracts, store completed 
documents, and share information.  As with any IT system, the websites are only 
as good as the people who maintain them. If individuals, groups, or organizations 
within the DoD contracting community create cost-saving knowledge and fail to 
share it with the thousands of other contracting officers worldwide, they allow the 
DoD to incur unnecessary costs for the same commodity or service.  Additionally, 
if policy-makers fail to enforce standards for data input, personnel may eliminate 
critical data that could impede its future use.  Davenport (2011) recommended 
that managers match KM systems by considering the degree of complexity and 
the level of interdependence among employees.  However, Nissen (2006) 
believed that although information flows through IT systems, physical reports, 
and other communication devices, it is experience and information that produce 
knowledge.  Facing the loss of many experienced contracting officers, the DoD 
must encourage knowledge collaboration at the individual, group, and 
organizational levels. 
 26 
Lund, Manyika, and Ramaswamy (2012) found that despite the many 
available KM systems and the productivity improvement resulting from those 
systems, the next challenge is to meet the needs of the ever-changing workforce 
while retaining the knowledge competitive advantage.  Lund et al. (2012) offered 
three techniques to help retain knowledge workers and avoid losing the 
knowledge-based competitive advantage: 
 break jobs down to eliminate tasks traditionally performed by 
knowledge workers that other non-knowledge workers could 
perform, thus utilizing a shortage; 
 go virtual to allow knowledge workers the flexibility to work from 
home, thus saving money in overhead costs; and 
 make work more flexible by having a mixture of full-time, part-time, 
in-office, remote, and temporary knowledge workers, thus lowering 
overhead costs. 
Additionally, Dewhurst et al. (2013) recommended outsourcing 
knowledge-based work to a lower-cost geographic region as another means of 
retaining knowledge workers and the competitive advantage.  As with any 
change, managers must communicate with employees and ensure that all 
employees understand and support the change.  Another challenge for managers 
will be to transfer knowledge when many of their knowledge workers never 
interact with the in-office workforce. 
It is important to have the right information at the right time and location 
when needed.  There are various transfer methods, including email, databases, 
meetings, seminars, conversations, and everyday employee interactions.  British 
Petroleum uses IT to transfer knowledge by videoconferencing (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001).  The company uses videoconferencing to display images of attending 
personnel, technical data, video clips, contract information, and ongoing issues 
(Alavi & Lediner, 2001).  While in Afghanistan, the Joint Task Force also used 
videoconferencing to communicate and collaborate with the Central Command in 
Florida, which allowed both groups to display attendees, data, and present 
information relating to the loan and foreign military sales of equipment for 
coalition partners.  The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) uses 
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multimedia techniques to transfer tacit and implicit knowledge to support the 
transfer of authority from one unit to another during deployments (Henderson et 
al., 2001).  CALL uses its website to post videos, images, and rich textual 
accounts that allow soldiers to rehearse future tacit experiences and 
commanders to learn tacit nuances experienced by their predecessors 
(Henderson et, al, 2001).  CALL continually conducts interviews, records real-
time videos, processes real-time images, and transforms them into useful 
knowledge broadcasted for use by hundreds of thousands of military personnel.  
It is often difficult for organizations to synchronize personnel across time and 
location, and because knowledge can flow in an informal and formal setting, with 
or without IT, it is important for managers to understand that communication and 
information flows drive knowledge transfer (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). 
2. Knowledge-flow Theory 
Before discussing how knowledge flows within an organization, it is 
important to differentiate between information and knowledge.  Nissen (2006) 
stated that “knowledge enables action (e.g., correct decisions, appropriate 
behaviors, useful work), whereas information provides meaning and context for 
such action (e.g., decision criteria, behavior norms, work specifications)” (p. 12).  
He went on to demonstrate this difference by providing the exact same 
information to two workers but with significantly differing experience.  Although 
these two individuals had access to the same information (e.g., computers, 
networks, reports, books), it was their experience that made the difference in 
knowledge (Nissen, 2006).  However, experience can also impede knowledge if 
used routinely as a repetitive rather than an adaptive activity (Hartley, Rashman, 
& Withers, 2009). 
Knowledge flow within an organization, whether tacit or explicit, is only as 
good as the method that employees within a firm use to keep it flowing.  Tacit 
knowledge tends to flow within an organization very slowly, whereas explicit 
knowledge tends to flow very broad and quickly.  Nissen (2006) pointed out 
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activity as the key to knowledge flow. He used Newton’s law of motion to explain 
that knowledge confined within an individual, or even in an IT system, tends to 
stay at rest unless there is some sort of activity (e.g., training, mentoring, 
research, trial and error, discussion) to spark the learning process (Nissen, 2006, 
p. 34).  Activity causes continuous learning, whether it is in the business or 
academic realm. Nissen (2006) explained that although some of this knowledge 
is not equally distributed, the more explicit and tacit knowledge a firm applies 
through action and performance, the more likely the organization will gain a  
competitive advantage.  Organizations that rely on explicit knowledge for a 
competitive advantage are susceptible to imitation by competitors, whereas 
organizations that rely more on tacit knowledge for a competitive advantage are 
more sustainable because tacit knowledge is difficult to imitate. 
Although knowledge flow happens around us every day, it takes time to 
perfect or even grasp. Nissen (2006) pointed out “as a general rule, individual 
knowledge does not flow well through an organization” (p. 11).  He went on to 
provide many examples of the difference between an expert’s performing an 
activity verses the expert’s teaching someone how to perform the activity.  The 
latter of the two would take more time and effort, verses just allowing the expert 
to perform the activity, but it would generate learning and knowledge flow. Winter 
and Zollo (2002) identified experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and 
knowledge codification as the three learning mechanisms in the development of 
dynamic capabilities within an organization. Experience accumulation is 
experiential learning through trial and error of tacit knowledge and explicit 
routines (Winter & Zollo, 2002).  Knowledge articulation refers to implicit 
knowledge articulation through constructive confrontations of colleagues in order 
to understand how to execute and perform a task better (Winter & Zollo, 2002).  
Knowledge codification refers to the documented codification of an individual’s 
understanding of performance implications and routines (Winter & Zollo, 2002). 
Nissen (2006) also addressed knowledge within groups.  Groups with the 
same information may very well outperform other groups due to the level of tacit 
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knowledge within the groups.  It is important for groups to interact with each other 
to share outcomes and help eliminate redundant work and potential lost 
opportunities, such as one group’s spending time creating a process that the 
other group has already created.  Groups, as opposed to individuals, tend to be 
the source of most activity within an organization (Hartley et al., 2009). 
3. The Spiral of Knowledge 
Ikujiro Nonaka (2007) developed the spiral of knowledge model to display 
knowledge creation and knowledge flow.  Figure 5 depicts the knowledge 
creation cycle.  The center of the model begins with knowledge creation from an 
individual, group, or organization.  The individual, group, or organization passes 
this new knowledge on to others through socialization or articulation.  Once the 
individual, group, or organization explicitly captures the knowledge, this 
knowledge, in combination with other tacit or explicit knowledge, can create 
something new or build on an individual’s tacit knowledge.  As long as knowledge 
creation and sharing continues, the spiral continues to turn. Nonaka (2007) broke 
down tacit and explicit knowledge into four categories that are usable in any 
organization:  
 From Tacit to Tacit: sharing knowledge from one person to another 
through socialization; 
 From Tacit to Explicit: articulating tacit knowledge into usable 
information that someone else can use; 
 From Explicit to Explicit: combining pieces of explicit knowledge 
into something new; and 
 From Explicit to Tacit: personnel take explicit knowledge and 
internalize it in order to build upon their tacit knowledge. 
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Figure 5.  The Spiral of Knowledge  
(From Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) 
4. Knowledge-flow and Workflow Interactions 
Nissen (2006) used an example of a student learning from an instructor.  
The instructor produces knowledge flow by conducting the activity of teaching the 
student.  This knowledge flow then continues as students interact with other 
students, tutors, or other professors. Nissen (2006) contrasted this example with 
a worker flipping burgers.  The student is learning through the knowledge 
process, whereas the worker is doing through the workflow process.  Both people 
are learning to some degree, but when it comes to knowledge flow, the student is 
gaining more knowledge because he or she focuses on learning and not on 
working.  The worker will only learn minimal things to be successful on the job, 
thus creating the workflow instead of the knowledge flow.  Figure 6 depicts 
Nissen’s (2006) relationship that “education contributes principally toward 
knowledge flows (learning) and negligibly toward workflows (doing); work in a 
fast-food restaurant has inverse contributions with respect to learning vs. doing” 
(p. 39).  Whether a person is on the knowledge-flow path or the workflow path, 
both paths may conduct research that will alter the vectors in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Knowledge-flow and Workflow Contributions 
(From Nissen, 2006, p. 39) 
5. Knowledge-flow Obstacles 
Nissen (2006) addressed four main obstacles to the flow of knowledge 
within an organization.  First, inactive knowledge not flowing within an 
organization, tacit or explicit, is underutilized.  Sometimes employees fear that 
giving up knowledge, especially when competing against others, will make them 
less valuable (Hansen & Nohria, 2004).  Additionally, employees may retain 
knowledge because they do not have time to help others and because they want 
to retain knowledge to obtain a good evaluation (Hansen & Nohria, 2004).  
Sometimes, power and influence can also cause people to manipulate or 
withhold their knowledge (Hartely et al., 2009).  Next, a person must have the 
ability to learn so that he or she can create and share reliable knowledge.  
Sometimes people within a department or group tend to value their own 
viewpoints and beliefs, resulting in the rejection of external knowledge (Hansen & 
Nohria, 2004).  Additionally, employees may not have the time or resources 
available to obtain knowledge while on the job or through higher education.  
Third, once the person is competent, he or she must be willing to share 
knowledge and transfer it effectively.  Employees who have not learned to work 
together or who are from different organizations tend to have difficulty in 
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transferring tacit knowledge, especially if the knowledge relates to complex 
technologies or best practices (Hansen & Nohria, 2004).  Additionally, cultural 
issues such as beliefs, trust, leadership, relationships, social media, and internal 
and external networks can impair knowledge transfer (Hartley et al., 2009).  The 
last obstacle is that a person must have internalized knowledge before he or she 
can apply or share it.  Employees may find it difficult to locate expert personnel or 
information required to complete a task, resulting in lost knowledge by the 
employee and less efficient work (Hansen & Nohria, 2004).  Although these 
obstacles may seem simple, not all people are free and willing to learn, share, or 
manage knowledge. 
Nissen (2006) presented five ways for leaders to overcome these 
obstacles to knowledge flow.  First, managers and leaders must allow and 
encourage the appropriate knowledge (restricted or unrestricted) to flow within 
their organization.  Next, managers and leaders need to understand the type of 
knowledge required (tacit or explicit) and how accessible the knowledge is for a 
particular task, because tacit knowledge tends to move slower than explicit 
knowledge.  Another way to overcome knowledge-flow obstacles is for managers 
to ensure that all the required knowledge flows are complete and that the critical 
path is identified prior to employees performing work, thus eliminating wasted 
time and resources.  The fourth way to overcome the obstacles is for managers 
to consider the premium on workflows versus knowledge flows within the 
organization.  Here, managers must decide whether a task requires learning the 
task through education or learning by doing the task (on-the-job).  Finally, Nissen 
(2006) recommended that managers need some kind of model to pull together 
the various factors, considerations, and alternatives associated with workflows 
and knowledge flows and to help support informed decision-making. 
Hansen and Nohria (2004) presented three ways to overcome these 
obstacles to knowledge flow.  First, leadership must demonstrate and emphasize 
the importance of collaboration, articulate teamwork values, and develop unified 
goals in order to motivate employees to seek or share knowledge.  If employees 
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see leaders collaborating and living up to values and goals and not just telling 
everyone else to do it, employees will be more likely to share or provide the 
required knowledge.  Next, employers should use a willingness to seek or 
provide help as a criterion for hiring and promoting personnel.  Finally, employers 
must develop a means of cross-cultivation relationships within an organization, 
establish a directory of experts by area, and develop a benchmark system that 
allows employees to identify best practices. 
IBM, which works with multiple not-for-profit and for-profit sector 
knowledge-based organizations, believes that companies who properly apply KM 
can have a huge impact on the company’s bottom line (Fontaine & Lesser, 
2002).  The company offered five roadblocks that organizations face in 
knowledge flow (Fontaine & Lesser, 2002): 
 failure to align knowledge management efforts with the 
organization’s strategic objectives; 
 creation of repositories without addressing the need to manage 
content; 
 failure to understand and connect knowledge management into 
individual’s daily work activities; 
 an overemphasis on formal learning efforts as a mechanism for 
sharing knowledge; and 
 focusing knowledge management efforts only within organizational 
boundaries. (p. 1)  
The DoD addresses many of these obstacles.  It has multiple databases 
available across its organizations to search for information, move employees 
around frequently to encourage knowledge sharing, provide numerous 
opportunities for increased education via distance or in-class learning, and 
appropriately provide access to restricted and unrestricted data.  Despite its 
efforts, the DoD still has problems with cross-collaboration between its 
departments.  Up until the last few years, when the Better Buying Power initiative 
came out, the DoD did little to promote procurement departments working with 
each other.  The DoD needs to address the differences between its departments’ 
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contracting offices and create an open contracting system that will encourage 
every department to share information and knowledge. 
Much of the aforementioned literature pointed out that KM is important in 
creating, storing, and transferring knowledge and, if harnessed, that knowledge 
can build a competitive advantage.  Although this sounds fairly simple, the virtual 
work environment, the changing workforce, IT systems, personnel’s willingness 
to share knowledge, and evaluations are just a few of the obstacles employers 
face as they attempt to harness knowledge within their organizations. 
D. STRATEGIC SOURCING 
According to the OMB (2005), “strategic sourcing is the collaborative and 
structured process of critically analyzing an organization’s spending and using 
this information to make business decisions about acquiring commodities and 
services more effectively and efficiently” (p. 1).  One for-profit sector firm stated, 
“Strategic Sourcing will be defined as the process of evaluating, selecting, and 
aligning suppliers or consortiums of suppliers to achieve operational 
improvements in support of an organization’s strategic goals” (Duffie & Koester, 
2005, p. 3).  The for-profit sector offers multiple definitions of strategic sourcing, 
depending on the strategies used for its respective corporations.  Despite the 
multiple definitions, both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors focus first on 
spend analysis and then leverage a respective area that will help cut costs while 
still providing quality products and services.  Between 1999 and 2001, John 
Deere reaped a $490,000 cost savings by replacing an expensive, one-time-use 
leather glove purchased over 12 months across 15 plants with a cheaper, dual-
use leather glove by analyzing data, consolidating multiple purchases, 
rationalizing the spend, and standardizing the glove (Moody, Nelson, & Stegner, 
2001).  John Deere also hired former experts from Holiday Inn and Marriot hotels 
to analyze consolidated lodging expenses over a three-year period; information 
that has helped these companies to negotiate down lodging expenses from $58 
per night to $38 per night (Moody et al., 2001).  Both of these John Deere 
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success stories hinged on having the right caliber of personnel working in the 
purchasing department.  Although the for-profit sector has recognized the 
benefits of strategic sourcing as far back as the 1970s, the DoD continues to 
struggle with implementing its own agency-wide framework for strategic sourcing 
(GAO, 2012c).  
1. History 
In the early 1970s, many top leaders did not value their purchasing 
department, instead treating purchasing as more of an administrative function 
(Ellram & Carr, 1994).  It was not until the oil shortages in 1973–74 that leaders 
began to look at the importance of purchasing; however, many leaders still did 
not incorporate purchasing into their corporate strategies (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  
In 1980, Michael Porter introduced his “five forces” model, which contributed to 
the recognition of the value of the purchasing function (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  
Some leaders began to recognize the purchasing department because the 
purchasing agent negotiated the terms and conditions of the contract and would 
ensure on-time delivery (Slaight, 2004).  At the same time, executives and 
managers saw the purchasing agent as the leveraging power. 
After conducting a case study on 15 firms, Robert F. Reck and Brian G. 
Long discovered that purchasing departments must travel through four phases of 
purchasing development before corporate leaders recognize them as a tool to aid 
in gaining a competitive advantage (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  The passive phase is 
composed of purchasing agents reacting to requirements from other departments 
(Ellram & Carr, 1994).  The independent phase requires the purchasing 
department to be proactive by developing efficient systems or programs that are 
recognized by leaders and managers (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  In the supportive 
phase, top leaders and management recognize the purchasing department as 
crucial to business functions (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  In the integrative phase, top 
leaders and management believe that success and competitive advantage 
primarily rest with the purchasing department (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  Some 
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variables that determine the maturity of the purchasing department include the 
organizational view of the purchasing department, the integration level of 
purchasing department, the proactiveness or reactiveness of the purchasing 
department, and the size of the organization.  Not only is it important for leaders 
and managers to recognize the purchasing department, but it is equally important 
for them to address how they should analyze purchasing decisions. 
In 1983, Peter Kraljic, in a seminal article in the Harvard Business Review, 
posited that purchasing must become more strategic—supply management.  He 
developed a purchasing portfolio model to categorize types of spend as strategic 
(high-profit impact, high supply risk), leverage (high-profit impact, low supply 
risk), bottleneck (low-profit impact, high supply risk), or noncritical (low-profit 
impact, low supply risk; Kraljic, 1983).  Strategic (critical) decisions focus on 
forecasting, modeling, market analysis, risk analysis, and make-or-buy decisions, 
while non-critical decisions focus on product standardization, volume, efficient 
processing, and inventory optimization (Kraljic, 1983).  Leveraged decisions 
focus on tendering, target pricing, substitution, and order volume optimization, 
while bottleneck decisions focus on volume insurance, vendor control, inventory 
security, and backup plans (Kraljic, 1983).  Kraljic (1983) believed that the 
following two factors could determine an organization’s supply strategy by 
exposing its purchasing power and level of risk: 
 The strategic importance of purchasing in terms of value added by 
product line, the percentage of raw materials in total costs, and 
their impact on profitability. 
 The complexity of the supply market gauged by supply scarcity, 
pace of technology and/or material substitution, entry barriers, 
logistics cost or complexity, and monopoly or oligopoly conditions. 
(p. 110) 
During this same period, purchasing evolved into “outsourcing” as a 
means to cut costs, improve delivery, and obtain better-quality items (Slaight, 
2004, p. 24).  Although many viewed outsourcing as a harsh business practice, it 
afforded a firm a chance to gain a competitive advantage.  It also forced local 
suppliers and engineers to think “outside the box” or lose potential clients to 
 37 
outsourcing.  Additionally, firms began re-engineering within their organizations 
to replace expensive business practices with cheaper outsourced ones (Slaight, 
2004). 
Slaight (2004) presented a seven-step model, shown in Figure 7, for 
organizations to utilize after conducting a spend analysis to determine categories 
as critical, leveraged, bottlenecked, or noncritical.  
 
Figure 7.  The Seven-Step Sourcing Process 
(From Slaight, 2004, p. 3) 
Although the seven-step process helped many firms to realize 
inefficiencies, not all firms used it.  Theoretical tension between competition and 
collaboration with suppliers, decreased interest by executives and managers, 
and the lack of tools to obtain current spend data kept many firms from 
employing this model (Slaight, 2004).  Today, there are many models used to 
make strategic purchasing decisions that all depend on the organization and 
relationships between the suppliers and purchasers. 
In 2007, center for advanced procurement and supply CAPS Research 
developed a 10-step strategy implementation process as part of a continuous 
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research project (Monczka & Petersen, 2011).  Because organizations frequently 
fail during implementation, CAPS Research focused on tracking multiple 
organizations over various industries.  CAPS Research also developed 22 
industry-wide tenets of strategic sourcing (discussed later in this chapter) for 
these organizations to implement using the 10-step transformation process 
(Monczka & Petersen, 2011).  Table 2 depicts the 10-step model (Monczka & 
Petersen, 2011).   
Table 2.   10-Step Implementation Process  
(From Monczka & Petersen, 2011) 
 
Since the economic crisis in 2008–2009, firms seeking to transform their 
sourcing strategies often have limited resources (Monczka & Petersen, 2011).  It 
is during the slow economic recovery that firms must be ever vigilant in finding 
efficiencies in strategic sourcing.  Monczka and Petersen (2011) claimed that 
firms must set clear goals, lock in resources, set transformation priorities, and 
then follow through with the transformation.   
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2. Tenets of Strategic Sourcing 
As with any strategy, a firm must have a set of principles or tenets that it 
follows to stay on course and continuously modifies to meet the ever-changing 
market.  In 2002, 2003, and recently in 2012, the GAO addressed a set of broad 
principles and practices used by leading companies for strategic sourcing. Table 
3 lists these broad principles and practices.   
Table 3.   Broad Principles and Practices of Strategic Sourcing at Leading 
Companies (From GAO, 2003, 2012c) 
 
Not all inclusive commitment, knowledge, change, and support are 
fundamental for a successful strategic sourcing plan, however.  Firms that 
applied some of these principles and practices realized substantial savings and 
many service improvements (GAO, 2003).  Without the basic tenets, a firm will 
have a hard time breaking through the strong employee work culture that may 
not understand a much-needed re-engineering process. 
Commitment, the first principle, is critical for senior management because 
they provide guidance, facilitation, and power to implement changes and obtain 
employee support (GAO, 2002).  According to a GAO (2002) study, a lack of top 
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management buy-in is the root of many restructuring failures.  If a firm is going to 
change its sourcing strategies, not only does the top management need to buy 
into the restructuring, but it must also follow up to ensure that employees and 
leaders buy in as well. 
The second principle, knowledge, claims that companies need to 
understand what they are spending their money on so that they can gain or 
maintain a competitive advantage (GAO, 2002).  Companies that conducted 
spend analysis realized much inefficiency, such as multiple providers, 
unleveraged suppliers, erratic policies and processes, and limited cross-location 
information sharing (GAO, 2002).  Many organizations spent months trying to 
obtain spend data because they did not have a system in place to gather and 
collect such data (GAO, 2002).  Although some managers might consider such a 
lengthy process to be expensive and time consuming, a prudent manager would 
understand that a small investment today could have a big payoff in the future. 
Change, the third principle, requires companies to develop and implement 
a corporation-wide viewpoint in order for them to get the best value (GAO, 2002).  
They need to enhance and empower their purchasing organization, assign 
commodity managers, establish cross-functional teams, conduct market 
research, carefully select providers, and monitor performance (GAO, 2002).  
Leading companies that made these changes were able to better manage and 
coordinate their purchases of services (GAO, 2002).  As with any changes in an 
organization, if the changes lack synchronization, they can create more 
inefficiencies and problems than the organization first started with. 
The final principle, support, requires top management to remain engaged 
at all times, foster open lines of communication, and utilize measurement tools to 
monitor and gauge the restructuring process (GAO, 2002).  Companies that 
employed these three techniques found that the techniques were crucial in 
overcoming opposition, cultural barriers, and other influences that often hinder 
the restructuring process (GAO, 2002).  A good company with a competitive 
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advantage must stay engaged in all aspects of the business or face possible 
market loss or hostile takeover.  
While conducting the spend analysis and market research, both the not-
for-profit and for-profit sectors look at cost drivers, which are usually one of the 
main driving forces of the contract costs.  Cost drivers are elements such as 
regulatory mandates, machine hours, labor hours, required skills, and travel.  The 
most widely used tool in accounting for cost drivers is the use of activity-based 
costing (ABC).  By using ABC, both the not-for-profit and for-profit sectors are 
able to identify direct and indirect costs associated with providing services on a 
contract.  This allows both the purchaser and the supplier to better manage their 
resources and eliminate those cost drivers that are unnecessary in order to cut 
costs. In 1996, Coopers and Lybrand identified over 120 mandated cost drivers 
that contributed to an 18% price premium for federally procured commodities and 
services (GAO, 1996).  The top 10 cost drivers listed in this study (GAO, 1996) 
were 
 DoD quality program requirements, 
 the Truth in Negotiation Act, 
 a cost/schedule control system, 
 configuration management requirements, 
 contract-specific requirements, 
 a Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)/Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) interface, 
 cost accounting standards, 
 a material management and accounting system, 
 engineering drawings, and 
 government property administration (p. 10).   
Although many of the previously mentioned cost drivers are set in place to 
protect the industrial base, they add costs to a contract and require close 
monitoring before, during, and after a contract award.   
A 2011 assessment conducted by CAPS Research indicated 22 tenets of 
strategic sourcing (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  The assessment collected data 
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from 119 organizations over 25 industries to establish the baseline for current 
and future research (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  CAPS Research began this 
assessment in 2007 to help firms cope with rapidly changing supply management 
(Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  The extensive list presented as follows, drawn 
from Monczka and Peterson (2011), depicts the prioritized importance of the 22 
tenets: 
 engagement by corporate executives and business unit leaders;  
 vision, mission, and strategic plan; 
 commodity and supplier strategy process; 
 strategic cost management; 
 procurement and supply organization structure and governance; 
 human resource development; 
 total cost of ownership (TCO);  
 structure and maintaining the supply base;  
 measurement and evaluation;  
 establishing world-class supplier quality; 
 supplier assessment, measurement, and communications;  
 cross-functional/location teaming;  
 strategic supplier alliance;  
 collaborative buyer/supplier development and continuous 
improvement; 
 accelerated change management;  
 supplier integration into new products, services, components, and 
development;  
 strategic insourcing/outsourcing;  
 standardization of products, services, components, and design 
specifications;  
 e-sourcing and supply chain strategies;  
 global sourcing and supply strategy; 
 environmentally sustainable supply chain management; and 
 supplier integration into customer order fulfillment (p. 21).  
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For any organization to be successful, whether implementing small or 
large strategies, the corporate executive and leaders must firmly believe, value, 
mimic, model, and enforce the new strategies.  As discussed in a GAO (2002) 
report, a lack of top management buy-in is the root of many restructuring failures.  
There are many different cultural behaviors within an organization, whether it be 
through common beliefs, common interests, ethnicity, tenure, or an overall work 
bond. It is important for leaders at all levels to address every behavioral culture to 
ensure that they bring about change in the overall organizational culture.  
Leaders should continuously remind all employees of how important they are to 
the success of the organization.  Executives should implement reorganization, 
set goals, participate, lead, and provide organizational and budgetary support for 
critical sourcing and supply-chain strategies and initiatives (Monczka & Peterson, 
2011).  During 2004–2010 procurement transformation, Georgia State executives 
realized that they needed to be more involved when their employees could not 
provide adequate solutions to customer feedback (Pennington, 2011).  The 
executives committed themselves to the procurement transformation by 
attending the Commission for New Georgia (CNG) meetings, recruiting the right 
personnel, using data-driven project models, implementing technology, and 
providing heightened visibility in the procurement department, which resulted in 
cost savings of over $100 million annually (Pennington, 2011).  Although 
executive involvement is critical for implementing strategies, world-class supply 
managers need not wait on the executives to buy in to the strategies; they should 
develop their own understanding of the organization to become part of the 
executive’s agenda (Moody et al., 2001).  Additionally, organizations live by 
many daily-unwritten policies, beliefs, values, and norms; however, when it 
comes to purchasing strategies and initiatives, it is important for an organization 
to have a written vision, mission, and strategic plan (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  
The written and understood vision and mission helps to explain how a supply 
network adds value to the success of the organization.  The written strategic plan 
provides a design for how the organization applies and accomplishes work within 
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the supply network (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Without an understanding of 
how the supply network operates, employees may miss opportunities and 
deadlines, which may cause a loss of profit, potential customers, and current 
customers.   
Once an organization develops its supply network, it can begin developing 
a commodity and supplier strategy process to help meet its purchasing goals.  This 
strategy includes a blueprint for an organization to categorize and develop 
strategies on obtaining essential short- and long-term commodities over a one- to 
three-year period (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Organizations should look at 
contracting, supply base, supplier development, product/process design, and value 
chain considerations (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  This strategy, along with the 
supply network, will force the organization to plan time lines, force accountability, 
and measure performance expectations (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).   
For an organization to gauge how its suppliers are performing, it needs to 
develop an evaluation and measurement strategy.  Organizations can develop 
measures to evaluate a supplier’s performance, strategies, processes, and 
cross-team/enterprise performance, as well as develop a scorecard metric to 
gauge performance against specific measures and objectives (Monczka & 
Peterson, 2011).  Presenting measure and evaluation criteria to the suppliers up 
front can alleviate any breakdowns in the supply network cause by ambiguous 
guidance.  Additionally, evaluation and measurement criteria can lead to 
increased efficiencies while still maintaining effectiveness.   
Additionally, organizations that rely on many suppliers to provide products 
or services can face bottlenecks or shortages if the organizations have no 
oversight of the supply chain.  If organizations want to reduce the risk of 
bottlenecks and shortages, they must establish a quality supplier (Monczka & 
Peterson, 2011).  To do this, an organization must obtain control of the supply 
chain by implementing internal and external, traditional and innovative quality-
control strategies at every stage of the supply chain (Monczka & Peterson, 
2011).  Although it may cost additional money to control the entire supply chain, 
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organizations gain the competitive advantage through increased customer 
satisfaction and stakeholder loyalty (Monczka & Peterson, 2011). 
Another strategy of gaining customer satisfaction and stakeholder loyalty 
is to constantly capture and provide feedback to suppliers about their 
performance.  This strategy helps to identify strategic, preferred, and lagging 
suppliers.  Organizations can provide strategic and preferred suppliers with 
additional business and develop or remove lagging suppliers from the supply 
base (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Organizations can obtain feedback through 
external customer comments or internal metric and evaluation assessments.   
Another strategy that every organization faces today is retaining 
knowledgeable and skilled personnel to achieve a competitive advantage 
(Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Executives and leaders must be flexible to meet 
the needs of the ever-changing workforce.  A recent study found that 
organizations should consider allowing workers the flexibility of working from 
home, assign non–knowledge-based duties to others, or even offer a mixture of 
part-time, full-time, in-office, remote, and temporary work to incentivize 
employees to remain with the organization (Lund et al., 2012).  Not every 
organization can manage their employees in this manner; therefore, other 
incentives include commissions, vacation packages, stock options, and bonuses, 
to name a few. Organizations that fail to attract, retain, or train employees run the 
risk of losing vital tacit knowledge as well as their competitive advantage. 
In a competitive environment, organizations must look for ways to 
minimize cost without reducing quality.  Every organization should use strategic 
cost management to identify and categorize all cost and cost drivers associated 
with the purchase of products or services (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  
Organizations will need to gather information pertaining to such things as design, 
quality, inventory, transportation, and disposal costs associated throughout the 
life cycle of the product or service (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  A careful 
analysis of these categories could result in the identification of a substitute 
material or service, consolidation of transportation assets, better inventory 
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management procedures, or a means of recycling that could result in cost 
savings without sacrificing quality.  Many education institutions where instructors 
provide online interactive classes have realized costs savings by eliminating the 
physical space required to house students without sacrificing quality.  
Additionally, organizations can utilize the TCO analysis to determine the relevant 
costs and cost drivers of buying a product or service from a supplier (Ellram & 
Siferd, 1998).  TCO includes all direct and indirect costs incurred throughout the 
life cycle of an item, comprising research and development, procurement, 
operations and maintenance, and disposal (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Proper 
TCO analysis can help to identify and eliminate costs not associated with the 
final product, such as calculating the cost of crewmembers into the total cost of a 
replacement aircraft because these crewmembers are not managing the 
research, development, operations, maintenance, or disposal of the aircraft.   
Organizations should continuously conduct market research to gain insight 
into the industrial base that supports their goals.  One strategy is for 
organizations to sort the industrial base by four categories—strategic, preferred, 
needs improvement, and not usable—to gain a structure that will enable them to 
use vendors appropriately in order to add value and maintain a competitive 
advantage (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  When the DoD does not have a major 
defense acquisition purchase for a supplier within its limited supply base, it will 
often purchase some sort of improvement, product, or service from that supplier 
to provide the supplier with enough work to maintain their business.  If the DoD 
does not work hard at implementing supply-base rationalization, it may not have 
suppliers available when unforeseen requirements arise.  Supply-base 
rationalization involves identifying and managing the correct number of suppliers 
used to lower prices based on volume, standardized services, and lower costs 
associated with managing transactions and the supply base (Duffy, 2005). 
Standardizing services across various divisions or locations within an 
organization can also reduce costs.  This strategy requires the organization to 
develop services for use in multiple configurations.  The military takes advantage 
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of standardization by procuring a standard cellular phone package that is the 
same for all personnel across the continental United States, thereby eliminating 
multiple contracts for various levels of services.  Automobile manufacturers 
standardize maintenance service packages to support manufacturer’s warranties 
and alleviate dealer service inconsistencies, thereby offering the same level of 
service to every customer.  Some organizations may choose not to standardize 
some things seen as a core competency—like Apple, which chooses to use its 
own operating systems in its electronics.  The DoD also applies standardization 
to commodities by purchasing multiple electronic parts like headlights, taillights, 
and light markers for use on many vehicles.  The standardization of commodities 
or services requires organizational buy-in. 
Before making large or complex purchasing decisions, an organization 
should gather personnel from across appropriate departments to work in tandem 
to develop purchasing strategies (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  The cross-
functional team strategy allows an organization to bring together a diverse group 
of expert people to assess complex or large procurement decisions, link them to 
the organization’s objectives, and help executives make a well-informed decision.  
The DoD uses this cross-functional team approach when developing large, 
complex major defense purchases such as ships, aircraft, vehicles, or weapons. 
This approach can identify issues up front to alleviate wasted resources. 
Much like the cross-functional team strategy, when an organization is 
developing new products or services, it should integrate the supplier (Monczka & 
Peterson, 2011).  This strategy can also help to eliminate wasted resources up 
front and strengthen the buyer/supplier relationship.  Either the organization can 
give full responsibility to the supplier, or the organization can just consult with the 
supplier for information (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Organizations should 
consider collaboration to gain all innovative ideas necessary to bring a quality 
product or service to fruition.  Supplier involvement in the development phase of 
a product or service can increase quality, reduce costs, and improve product- or 
service-to-market time (McGinnis & Vallopra, 1999). 
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Many centrally led organizations conduct business with firms abroad and 
must decide how to control the purchasing authority.  One strategy that CAPS 
Research offered is to develop global commodity councils to act on behalf of the 
organization in order to link sourcing goals to organizational goals, thereby 
making it easier to meet the needs of the global customer (Monczka & Peterson, 
2011).  Although this strategy may seem risky due to the decentralized 
procurement approach, if managed properly, it can help to establish strong 
relationships with customers and suppliers abroad.  It can sometimes prove 
difficult for organizations that conduct global business to interact with customers 
and suppliers if they do not have representation at that geographic location.  By 
assigning global commodity teams, organizations can possibly eliminate some of 
the risks of receiving substandard commodities and services as well as reduce 
costs. 
Organizations that conduct business abroad should implement a global 
sourcing and supply strategy.  If the organization has developed global 
purchasing teams abroad, it should utilize those teams to gather information 
about customers, company needs, and supply bases in order to make decisions 
(Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  By having teams abroad, the organization will be 
able to better leverage international suppliers as well as help to develop those 
international supplier relationships.  Without an organizational representative that 
can actually meet with international suppliers, organizations run the chance of 
shortages and bottlenecks. 
Organizations can also gain great efficiency and become more effective 
by using e-sourcing and supply-chain strategies via the Internet.  Online sourcing 
and supply chain management can keep executives and leaders at all levels 
informed of purchases, as well as where things are located in the supply chain.  
Using the Internet can help organizations to streamline manual processes, track 
supply and demand in real-time, manage suppliers, and purchase supplies 
(Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Although this information can be beneficial, it can 
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also hinder a process if the information is not accessible or is not current.  
Organizations should ensure that they invest in a good KM process. 
Organizations can also seek a strategic supplier alliance by conducting a 
spend analysis, identifying large cost drivers, analyzing risk associated with 
multiple suppliers, and developing strategic supplier scenarios to collaborate with 
the best suppliers while reducing the bottom line (Kraljic, 1983).  These alliances 
create long-term partnerships that “leverage the strategic and operational 
capabilities of individual participating companies to achieve significant ongoing 
benefits to each party” (Monczka & Peterson, 2011, p. 51).  Because start-up 
production can be costly, many organizations use long-term partnerships with 
suppliers as a means of lowering the initial cost.  Suppliers can then transfer low 
costs to the customer, thereby increasing an organization’s competitive 
advantage. 
Another strategy to help build supplier alliances is to collaborate and 
develop the supplier and to constantly seek improvement (Monczka & Peterson, 
2011).  Organizations should continuously utilize measures and metrics to refine 
processes and procedures within their organization as well as in their supply 
network.  This approach looks at the organization and the supplier as a joint 
venture, seeking out ways to improve, commit joint resources for development, 
and share the risks and rewards (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Taking time to 
develop a supplier can be beneficial in the long term but may also pay off in the 
short term if a purchaser needs something expedited.  Supplier alliances can 
also help when rapid changes in an organization occur. 
An accelerated change management strategy can be difficult on 
organizations.  New technology and innovative processes require that 
organizations rapidly evolve and shift the entire culture of the organization in a 
new direction (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Key to this transformation is the 
executives’ and leaders’ engagement to gain buy-in from all employees.  
Monczka and Peterson (2011) suggested that because this rapid change will 
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occur frequently, “project and process implementation speed should be 
measured, communicated, and reinforced throughout the organization” (p. 53). 
Strategic insourcing and outsourcing is on the forefront of every 
purchasing decision within an organization.  Before organizations make a 
purchasing decision, they should “evaluate internal capabilities, competencies, 
and capacity verses external sources and capabilities to identify opportunities to 
better focus on core competencies, improve product/service differentiation, and 
develop and sustain competitive advantage” (Monczka & Peterson, 2011, p. 50). 
CAPS Research is unique in that Monczka and Petersen have continued 
to update their research every other year to determine the extent to which firms 
are applying sourcing strategies.  Since the first CAPS Research report in 2007, 
firms have increased the use of sourcing strategies from 5.27% of the overall 
strategy implementation in 2007 to 5.50% in 2011 (Monczka & Petersen, 2011).  
Although there has been an increase in the use of these sourcing strategies 
among their subjects, firms continue to lag in implementing these critical 
measures (Monczka & Petersen, 2011).  Monczka and Petersen (2011) 
suggested that firms invest resources and time to the cross-functional and cross-
enterprise collaboration in order to be successful.   
3. Current DoD Initiatives 
After years of working with subordinate agencies to gain efficiencies by 
using strategic sourcing, the OMB established the Federal Strategic Sourcing 
Initiative (FSSI) program under the control of the General Services Administration 
(GSA; 2012). The goals of the FSSI are to 
 strategically source across federal agencies; 
 establish mechanisms to increase total cost savings, value, and 
socioeconomic participation; 
 collaborate with industry to develop optimal solutions; 
 share best practices; and  
 create a strategic sourcing community of practice. 
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Through the FSSI program, the DoD implemented some of the top tenets 
of strategic sourcing to help create a framework that would meet its goals (GAO, 
2012c).  However, in FY2011, agencies sent only 15% of their total spending on 
products and services covered by the FSSI program through the FSSI program 
(GAO, 2012c). Of that 15% of overall spending, the FSSI program recognized an 
18% cost savings (GAO, 2012c).  The 18% savings resulted from the 
consolidated government-wide purchasing of office supplies, domestic delivery 
services, and telecommunications expense management services (GAO, 2012c).  
The FSSI program currently utilizes six government-wide initiatives for strategic 
sourcing: office supplies, domestic delivery services, telecommunication 
services, print management, commercial off-the-shelf software/services, and 
wireless rate plans/devices (GAO, 2012c). 
Although the DoD has committed to using some of the FSSI contracts, a 
program acquisition and strategic sourcing (PASS) representative said, “The 
department would be more likely to commit to current and planned FSSI 
contracts if those contracts showed significant savings/best value over 
established DoD contracts” (GAO, 2012c, p. 35).  The themes across most of the 
agencies for not using the FSSI include maintaining control over their contracts, 
having unique requirements, and boasting that they can get lower prices than the 
FSSI contracts (GAO, 2012c). 
In 2010, Ashton Carter, then–USD(AT&L), started another initiative.  He 
laid out the memorandum Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (OUSD, 2010a).  This guidance 
came because of a “mandate to deliver better value to the taxpayer and 
warfighter by improving the way the Department does business” (OUSD, 2010a).  
Carter (OUSD, 2010a) highlighted the following five initiatives with 23 sub-
initiatives derived from industry and acquisition experts: 
 target affordability and control cost growth, 
 incentivize  productivity and innovation in industry, 
 promote real competition, 
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 improve tradecraft in service acquisition, and 
 reduce non-productive process and bureaucracy. 
Since Carter signed this memo, Frank Kendall, the new USD(AT&L), has 
issued Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (Kendall, 2012).  Kendall (2012) adjusted the 
initiatives to ensure that the DoD could deliver warfighting capabilities while 
balancing a declining budget.  The new memorandum, signed in 2012, modified 
existing initiatives and added an additional two initiatives, totaling seven 
initiatives with 36 sub-initiatives (Kendall, 2012): 
 achieve affordability, 
 control costs throughout product life cycle, 
 incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and government, 
 eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy, 
 promote effective competition, 
 improve tradecraft in the acquisition of services, and 
 improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. 
Over the past few decades, the DoD has focused on promoting 
efficiencies in the acquisition of products but is now looking at gaining efficiencies 
in service contracts as well, because more than half of all contract spending 
involves services. Under the original Better Buying Power initiative, the DoD 
mandated the use of senior managers in each of the components to improve the 
acquisition of services (OUSD, 2010a).  These senior managers will help to 
develop market segmentation and a new market research portal and to share 
service contract management best practices between commands (Kendall, 
2012).  The DoD will also better define requirements to eliminate requirements 
creep (Kendall, 2012).  It will also strengthen service contract management for 
services other than research and development and the product support used at 
installations (Kendall, 2012).  The DoD will also leverage the use of small 
businesses in service contracting as a means of cost saving (Kendall, 2012). 
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Although all of these initiatives set in motion by the DoD are a great start 
in transforming the strategic sourcing processes, they are not immune to policies, 
mandates, and personnel that do not line up with these initiatives.  One issue is 
that procurement officials are unaware of strategic contract vehicles because 
there is no centralized source of information—and even if there were, many 
leaders are hesitant to use them for fear of losing the ability to customize 
requirements (GAO, 2012c).  Leaders are also hesitant to report cost savings for 
fear of budget cuts (GAO, 2012c); likewise, program managers and contractors 
are hesitant for fear of losing their relationships with suppliers or not having the 
ability to control the contract (GAO, 2012c).  Even now that the DoD has 
mandated the use of strategic sourcing in its contracts, there is not a centralized 
measurement tool to depict savings because each component must track these 
savings in order to report to the DPAP. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we provided a brief synopsis of topics relevant to the 
sourcing of knowledge-based services.  We started by highlighting the 
characteristics, workforce issues, and inherently governmental functions as they 
relate to services, followed by an overview of knowledge-based services.  Next, 
we explored knowledge management issues involving the characteristics and 
obstacles of knowledge flow.  We concluded with the basic history, tenets, and 
current DoD initiatives of strategic sourcing.  A review of the literature pertaining 
to this research topic is only one of many ways to address our research 
questions.  In the next chapter, we outline the methodology we used to achieve 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to achieve our research objectives and answer our research 
questions, we have provided an overview of our data collection and analysis in 
this chapter.  We utilized a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques.  With respect to the quantitative research, we started by analyzing 
the USAF spend data from FY2010 which was supported by a content analysis of 
contracts data extracted from EDA and FPDS-NG.  Additionally, we conducted a 
qualitative analysis of available literature and undertook action research by 
conducting interviews.  One of our team members attended the 13th Annual 
Institute of Supply Management (ISM) Services Conference in Phoenix, Arizona.  
This conference yielded insights into how the for-profit sector applies strategic 
sourcing principles to the procurement of knowledge-based services.  
Additionally, the team member identified several subject matter experts for 
participation in this research.  Based on a literature review and an analysis of the 
USAF spend data, we formulated a questionnaire to gather information to aid in 
answering the research questions.  In this chapter, we begin by listing the 
methodology we used to answer our research questions, followed by explaining 
the approach we used to conduct the spend analysis.  Additionally, we include 
the modus operandi used for selection of research participants and development 
of our interview questionnaire.  Table 4 depicts our research questions and the 
methodology we used to address them. 
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Table 4.   Methodology Used to Answer Research Questions 
 Research Question Methodology 
1 What are the relevant tenets of strategic 
sourcing?   
Literature Review & 
Qualitative Interviews 
2 What are commercial best practices in sourcing 
knowledge-based services? 
Literature Review & 
Qualitative Interviews 
3 What are the constraints, if any, of applying the 
commercial best practices in the USAF context? 
Literature Review & 
Qualitative Interviews 
4 What are the different types of knowledge-based 
services being procured?   How much money is 
spent on these services, with how many different 
contractors, from how many different buying 
offices, and through how many different contract 
actions?  How many are with small businesses?  
How many are sole source?  What is the 
composition by contract type? 
Spend Analysis 
5 What are the different outcomes/deliverables of 
contracted knowledge-based services (e.g., 
technical reports, research, staff support labor, 
education, training, analysis, advice, briefings, 
white papers)? 
Spend Analysis, 
Content Analysis & 
Qualitative Interviews 
6 Of the different outcomes of knowledge-based 
services, what are the major cost drivers (e.g., 
time, labor rates, skills, travel) of each by type?  
How are costs minimized? 
Content Analysis & 
Qualitative Interviews 
7 Can those cost drivers be better managed to 
increase efficiency without compromising 
effectiveness?   If so, how? 
Cost Driver Analysis 
& Qualitative 
Interviews 
8 By applying commercial best practices and 
original ideas, how much cost could be saved or 
avoided? 
Spend Analysis & 
Cost Driver Analysis 
 
B. SPEND ANALYSIS 
Spend analysis is defined as “a tool that provides knowledge about who 
are the buyers, who are the suppliers, how much is being spent for what goods 
and services, and where are the opportunities to leverage buying power” (GAO, 
2004, p. 2).  Although undertaking a spend analysis is a time-consuming and 
laborious task, a spend analysis has the potential to identify targets of 
opportunities and current risks in the acquisition of supplies and services (Cook, 
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Grammich, Lindenblatt, & Moore, 2004).  According to Marmanis & Pandit, 
“Spend analysis can provide holistic detailed visibility into spend patterns, 
creating a foundation from which opportunities for savings can be identified and 
actions on them can be taken” (2008, p. XV).   
To undertake the research, we analyzed USAF spend data for FY2010.  
Although the DoD revised the PSC manual in 2011, we used the 1998 PSC 
manual to better align the PSCs with the 2010 spend data.  The DoD divides the 
PSCs into three main parts: 
 Part A: Research and Development; 
 Part B: Services; and  
 Part C: Supplies & Equipment. 
The USAF FY2010 spend data included 147,222 contract actions 
(including modifications) with a total spend of $63.03 billion.  Out of this total 
spend, the USAF obligated $25.85 billion, which was 41.02% of the total spend, 
towards the procurement of services from Section-1, Part-B (Services), and 82 
PSCs pertaining to services in Section-1, Part-A (Research and Development).  
The 1998 PSC manual did not have a separate category for knowledge-based 
services; however, the OUSD memorandum Taxonomy for the Acquisition of 
Services clearly identifies 218 PSCs in the category of knowledge-based 
services (OUSD, 2010b).  Knowledge-based services in the FY2010 data of the 
USAF accounted for an obligation of $9.77 billion, which was 15.5% of the total 
spend and 37.82% of spend on services.  Most of the spending on knowledge-
based services was concentrated in Category R (Professional, Administrative, 
and Management Services).  Category R included a total spend of $8.32 billion, 
representing 13.21% of the total spend for FY2010 and 32.19% of spend on 
services.  Category R has three subcategories, namely 
 professional services, 
 administrative services, and 
 management services. 
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In order to conduct the detailed spend analysis and evaluate the 
inefficiencies, we narrowed the scope of this research to five PSCs from 
Category R.  These five PSCs were selected based on maximizing the amount of 
spend under the premise of exploiting potential inefficiencies.  These five codes 
comprised a total spend of $5.26 billion, which is 8.35% of the total spending, 
20.35% of service spending, and 53.82% of knowledge-based service spending 
for FY2010. Table 5 outlines the details of these five PSCs. 
Table 5.   Total Spending on Selected PSCs for FY2010 
PSC Description Spend (U.S. $) 
Spend as a percentage 
of knowledge-based 
services 
R-408 Program Management / 
Support Services 
765.65 million 9.2% 
R-414 Systems Engineering 
Services 
1.91 billion 22.96% 
R-425 Engineering and 
Technical Services 
1.27 billion 15.38% 
R-706 Logistics Support 
Services 
1.12 billion 13.47% 
R-707 
Contract, Procurement, 
and Acquisition Support 
Services 
184.6 million 2.22% 
 
After selecting the relevant PSCs, we identified the number of contractors, 
the number of different buying offices, the total number of contract actions, 
applicability of competition, types of contracts, and the number of small 
businesses for these services.   
C. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
To effectively conduct an in-depth data analysis and to answer research 
questions, such as the outcomes of these contracts in terms of deliverables and 
the cost drivers, we down-selected to 100 contracts.  The contracts were evenly 
divided into the five selected categories based on the highest amount of spend. 
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We extracted the selected 100 contracts and their performance work statements 
(PWS)/SOWs from EDA/FPDS–NG.  Our team deliberated on all the contracts 
and their associated PWS/SOWs and subsequently used an Excel spreadsheet 
to document the deliverables and the cost drivers.  The content analysis, in 
collaboration with the data gathered from the qualitative interviews, helped us to 
answer our research questions.  During the content analysis, we also identified 
some improper coding within the selected 100 contracts, which we discuss in 
Chapter IV. The 100 selected contracts in the five PSCs accounted for 22.17% of 
the spending in the five categories.  Table 6 depicts the amount spent on the 
selected 20 contracts in each category vis-à-vis the total spend in that particular 
category. 
Table 6.   Spend on Selected Contracts 
S No PS Code Spend on Selected 20 
Contracts 
Percentage of total 
spend  
1 R-408 110,348,723.33 14.41% of R-408 
2 R-414 438,937,475.26 22.96% of R-414 
3 R-425 194,646,700.74 15.20% of R-425 
4 R-706 314,793,589.16 28.07% of R-706 
5 R-707 107,841,908.43 58.41% of R-707 
D. QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
In order to explore the current best practices, one of our team members 
attended the 13th Annual ISM Services Conference in Phoenix, Arizona, during 
the week of December 4–7, 2012.  Besides gaining insight into how the for-profit 
sector applies strategic sourcing principles to the procurement of services, the 
team member identified a number of relevant professionals for interviews.  
Additionally, we identified businesses supporting CAPS Research, as well as 
representatives from the not-for-profit sector, for inclusion in the interviews.  We 
invited 83 for-profit and 16 not-for-profit contacts to participate in the research 
interview.  Seven for-profit sector contacts and four not-for-profit sector contacts 
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participated.  Despite the lack of participation and lengthy questionnaire, our 
team achieved an 11% participation rate, which is within the 10–15% average 
external survey participation rate.   
1. Interview Questionnaire  
Based on the spend analysis and literature review, we developed for-profit 
and not-for-profit interview questionnaires (see Appendix A and B) to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What are the relevant tenets of strategic sourcing? 
2. What are commercial best practices in sourcing knowledge-based 
services? 
3. What are the constraints, if any, of applying the commercial best 
practices in the USAF context? 
4. What are the different outcomes/deliverables of contracted 
knowledge-based services (e.g., technical reports, research, staff 
support labor, education, training, analysis, advice, briefings, white 
papers)? 
5. Of the different outcomes of knowledge-based services, what are 
the major cost drivers (e.g., time, labor rates, skills, travel) of each 
by type?  How are costs minimized? 
6. Can those cost drivers be better managed to increase efficiency 
without compromising effectiveness?   If so, how? 
We formulated two different questionnaires: one for the for-profit sector 
and the other for the not-for-profit sector.  To ensure face validity, two 
academicians reviewed the questionnaire.  Additionally, the Director of the 
Knowledge-Based Services Commodity Council at Wright–Patterson Air Force 
reviewed the questionnaire.  We made changes based on their expert advice.  
Subsequently, the assistant dean and a specialist from the Human Research 
Protection Program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and the chair of the 
NPS Institution Review Board (IRB) also reviewed the questionnaire.  Finally, the 
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president of the NPS approved the questionnaire.  The questionnaire was 
composed of 37 questions for the for-profit sector and 28 questions for the not-
for-profit sector. 
2. Interview Process 
The research participants responded to the research questionnaire either 
via email or through telephonic interview.  Out of the 11 interviews, six responded 
via email and five over the phone.  For time and quality purposes, we initially 
recorded phone interviews and later the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) at 
NPS transcribed them.  We analyzed 114 pages, out of which 38 pages were 
from email respondents and 76 pages were transcriptions from ARP.  We used 
an Excel spreadsheet to document the participants’ answers to the respective 
for-profit and not-for-profit questionnaire and used this data to answer our 
research questions.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we began with a brief synopsis of methodology used to 
answer our research questions.  We then highlighted the strategy used for 
quantitative analysis (i.e., spend and content analysis).  We concluded with a 
layout of qualitative analysis, describing modus operandi for the selection of 
research participants and the development and evaluation of our interview 
questionnaire.  In the next chapter, we analyze the quantitative and qualitative 
data followed by the answers to our research questions. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the FY2010 USAF spend data, 
analyze the completed interview data, and answer the research questions in light 
of the literature review.  We begin by providing a quantitative analysis of the 
USAF FY2010 spend data, followed by a qualitative analysis of the responses to 
for-profit– and not-for-profit–sector interview questions.  We conclude by using 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis to answer the research questions in 
order to make well-informed recommendations and identify areas for future 
research. 
B. ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE DATA 
To undertake the quantitative research, we analyzed the USAF spend 
data for FY2010 (FPDS-NG, 2010).  The USAF FY2010 spend data included 
147,222 contract actions totaling $63.03 billion, with acquisition of services being 
a major portion of this expenditure.  The USAF obligated $25.85 billion acquiring 
services, which was 41.02% of the total USAF spend.  Out of 147,222 contract 
actions, 54,448 were initial awards, delivery orders and task orders accounting 
for $22.13 billion, while the remaining 92,774 contract actions were modifications, 
accounting for an obligation of $40.90 billion. 
Because our research focused on analyzing knowledge-based services, 
we concentrated on the spend data from 218 PSCs in the category of 
knowledge-based services.  Knowledge-based services in FY2010 accounted for 
$9.77 billion, which was 15.5% of the total USAF spend and 37.82% of the total 
spend for services.  Out of the total spend of $9.77 billion on knowledge-based 
services, $3.59 billion were obligated on initial awards, delivery orders and task 
orders, whereas the remaining $6.18 billion were obligated towards 
modifications.  Out of the total available 218 knowledge-based services codes, 
126 PSCs accounted for the entire spend of $9.77 billion.  There was no 
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expenditure on the remaining 92 PSCs during FY2010.  Out of the total 
expenditure of $9.77 billion on knowledge-based services, an amount of $2.47 
billion, which corresponds to 25.36% of the spend of knowledge-based services, 
was not coded under a specific PSC.  The recording of the $2.47 billion 
expenditure under the title of “other services,” is a convenient approach by the 
contracting officer to enter the contract data in FPDS-NG when a contract 
contains multiple CLINs pertaining to different PSCs.  As a result, anyone 
examining the data post hoc may not be able to discern what the USAF bought 
without opening the actual contracts.  Table 7 depicts the details of obligations 
under the heading of “other services.” 
Table 7.   Details of Obligations Under “Other Services” 
PS Code Description Obligation (U.S. $) 
AB96 R&D-Other Svc & Develop (Mgmt Sup) 3,000.00 
AC96 R&D-Misc Hard Goods (Mgmt Sup) 1,390,426.00 
AD96 Other defense (Mgmt Sup) 10,109,305.18 
AJ96 R&D-Other Sciences (Mgmt Sup) 1,371,312.96 
AR96 R&D-Other Space (Mgmt Sup) -232,302.69 
B599 Other Special Studies and Analyses 28,9844,386.9 
R499 Other Professional Services 1,412,058,413.00 
R699 Other Administrative Support Svcs 253,216,164.8 
R799 Other Management Support Services 396,644,458.3 
T099 Other Photo Mapping Printing Svc 5,189,897.07 




The USAF conducted all acquisitions of supplies and services in FY2010 
through 245 different buying offices.  Out of 245 buying offices, 209 buying 
offices were involved in the acquisition of knowledge-based services.  
Involvement of more than 80% of the total buying offices in the acquisition of 
knowledge-based services may deny the USAF opportunities to reduce 
transaction costs and to reap the benefits of economies of scales through 
contract consolidation.  One for-profit sector interview identified contract 
consolidation as one of the commercial best practice for achieving efficiencies, 
which we discuss later in this chapter under Section D (Answer to RQ 2).  In 
addition, fragmented buying and duplication of effort in purchasing knowledge-
based services may also prohibit program managers, contracting officers, end 
users, and functional managers from capturing tacit knowledge to achieve 
efficiencies.  One key tenet of strategic sourcing - developing deep category 
expertise - is foregone by fragmented buying. 
In FY2010, 18,819 different contractors undertook business with the 
USAF, out of which 3,292 were involved in the provision of knowledge-based 
services.  Of the 3,292 contractors involved in the provision of knowledge-based 
services, 658 contractors (20%) accounted for 22,207 contract actions 
representing 81.37% of the total contract actions.  We used the 80/20 rule to 
come up with a figure of 658 contractors.  The other 5,084 contract actions 
distributed among the remaining 2,634 contractors averaged 1.93 contracts per 
contractor.  This highlights the opportunity to realize cost savings in terms of 
transactional costs by reducing the number of contracts, task orders, and 
suppliers and resembles the preferred partner approach as practiced by two of 
the seven for-profit sector interviewees discussed later in the qualitative analysis 
part of this chapter.  Figure 8 depicts the distribution of knowledge-based 
contract actions among different contractors. 
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Figure 8.  Contractors vs. Contract Actions Distribution 
FPDS–NG spend data for FY2010 has a total of 147,222 contract actions, 
which included 54,448 initial awards, delivery orders and task orders.  The USAF 
acquired knowledge-based services through 27,291 contract actions that 
included 6,677 initial awards, delivery orders and task orders.  Knowledge-based 
services contract actions accounted for 18.53% of the total contract actions and 
12.26% of the initial awards, delivery orders and task orders for FY2010.  This 
relatively low percentage of knowledge-based services in the initial awards, 
delivery orders and task orders, vis-à-vis total contract actions, highlights that the 
USAF is spending a substantial amount of total obligations on modifications of 
original contracts.   
Most of the spending on knowledge-based services was concentrated in 
Category R (Professional, Administrative, and Management Services).  Category 
R included a total spend of $8.32 billion, representing 13.21% of the total spend 
for FY2010 and 32.19% of spend on services.  In order to conduct the detailed 
spend analysis and evaluate any inefficiencies, we focused this research on five 
PSCs from Category R.  These five PSCs were selected based on the maximum 
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which is 8.35% of the total spending, 20.35% of service spending, and 53.82% of 
knowledge-based service spending for FY2010.  Table 8 depicts the details of 
obligation on these five PSCs including number of contracts, buying offices and 
the contractors. 
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In FY2010, the DoD set a goal for small business set-aside contracts at 
22.28% of the total obligated dollars and achieved 20.94% (Small Business 
Administration [SBA], 2013).  However, the USAF fell behind the DoD 
achievements with 14.4% of its obligated dollars going towards small business 
set-aside contracts (U.S. Air Force, 2012).  Although the set-aside percentage is 
much less than the overall goal of the DoD, it highlights the problems faced by 
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the USAF buying offices to meet the socioeconomic programs.  As per the 
interview data, none of the for-profit sector buying offices faced any 
socioeconomic constraint in implementing the best practices for cost savings.  
The government mandates socioeconomic set-aside goals to the DoD, and 
Kendall (2012) recognized this as an effective source of innovation that can help 
in reducing costs.  As per the FAR 19.202-1, “Small business concerns shall be 
afforded an equitable opportunity to compete for all contracts that they can 
perform to the extent consistent with the Government’s interest” (2013c). 
However, the socioeconomic set-aside requirements may make it difficult 
for the USAF to consolidate contracts and to use preferred partner strategies.  
For-profit sector interviews identified contract consolidation and preferred 
partners’ strategies as a means of cost savings, and therefore will be discussed 
later in this chapter under Section D (Answer to RQ 2).  The FSSI program also 
emphasized cost savings through contract consolidation and socioeconomic 
participation (GSA; 2012).  Through the implementation of the FSSI programs, 
the government achieved an 18% savings due to consolidated purchasing. 
(GAO, 2012c).  Therefore, while contract consolidation may be difficult, it is not 
impossible. 
While outlining the achievements of federal government procurement in 
FY2010, the Honorable Daniel I. Gordon, highlighted that the federal government 
continuously increased the small business participation over the last two years 
and awarded nearly $100 billion worth of contracts to small businesses (Gordon, 
2011).  Gordon was optimistic that more opportunities would open up as the 
government unveils its modern techniques in small business buying tools 
(Gordon, 2011).  However, during the same time period, the USAF was unable to 
achieve its small business goals.  The trend of the small business participation in 
the USAF contracts saw a continuous decrease from 2008 to 2011 as depicted in 
Figure 9 (U.S. Air Force, 2012). 
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Figure 9.  USAF Small Business Programs  
(From U.S. Air Force, 2012) 
Promoting and creating a competitive environment can result in 
substantial cost savings.  The better buying power 2.0 initiative emphasized 
promoting effective competition in order to control and reduce costs (Kendall, 
2012).  However, the FPDS–NG data for the knowledge-based services 
highlights the presence of 748 out of 2,160 original contracts in our selected five 
categories as a sole source arrangement.  Table 9 depicts the breakdown of sole 






Table 9.   Breakdown of Sole / Single Source Contracts 


















651 79 62 9.5% 
R414 Systems Engineering 
Services 
544 34 193 35.47% 
R425 Engineering and 
Technical Services 
788 118 191 24.23% 
R706 Logistics Support 
Services 





17 6 2 11.76% 
Total  2160 250 498 23.05% 
 
Out of the total original contracts, 250 contracts were ‘not available for 
competition’, while the remaining 498 contracts were ‘not competed’.  ‘Not 
available for competition’ are single-source set-aside contracts in which the buyer 
chooses a specific company due to its peculiar requirements and by-passes 
competition.  For example, contract number FA820110R0016 in Program 
Management / Support Services (R-408) was not available for competition; the 
contract was a set-aside and only one offer was received (FPDS-NG, 2010).  
‘Not competed’ are sole sourced contracts where the buyer searched for 
suppliers and discovered that only one vendor was available.  For example, 
contract number FA483010MS012 in Program Management / Support Services 
(R-408) was not competed and also was not a set-aside (FPDS-NG, 2010).  
Four-hundred and ninety eight contracts in the category of not competed, 
represent 23.05% of all knowledge-based contracts in our selected five 
categories, which depict a possible opportunity for supplier development and cost 
savings.  However, the opportunity of supplier development varies with respect to 
the services contracted.  As per our selected PSCs, maximum opportunity lies in 
R414 (Systems Engineering Services), where 35.47% of the contracts were not 
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competed.  Creating competitive environment in sole-source knowledge-based 
contracts presents an opportunity of savings for the USAF. 
The USAF used a variety of contract types while procuring knowledge-
based services.  Table 10 depicts the breakdown of 2,160 contracts in the 
selected five PSCs by contract type.  In 45.69% of the fixed-price contract 
actions, the liability of cost overruns was inclined towards the contractor, 
whereas the remaining 54.31% of the contract actions (cost reimbursement, 
labor hour [LH] and time and material [T&M]) placed more cost risk on the 
government.  On the other hand, our analysis of the for-profit sector interviews 
reflected that four out of seven respondents preferred the use of fixed-price 
contracts where the performance risk lay more with the contractor. 
Table 10.   Breakdown of Selected Product Service Codes by Contract Type 
Contract Type Number Percentage 
Fixed-price  987 45.69% 
Cost-reimbursement 868 40.18% 
Time-and-material (T&M) 275 12.73% 
Labor hour (LH) 30 1.38% 
 
To analyze the data in-depth and answer research questions such as 
outcomes of these contracts in terms of deliverables and cost drivers, we 
extracted a sample of 100 contracts along with their SOWs, statements of 
objectives (SOOs), or the PWSs, evenly divided into the five categories based on 
the highest amount of spend.  The 100 selected contracts in the five PSCs 
accounted for 22.17% of the spending in the five categories.  The amount spent 
on the 20 selected contracts in each category, vis-à-vis the total spend in that 
particular category, is given in Table 6 (see Chapter III). 
The FAR highlights the essentiality of a precisely written SOW for sound 
contracting and to negotiate a fair price for the contracted service (DoD, 1996).  
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According to DoD’s Guidebook for the acquisition of services, “the PWS 
comprises the ‘heart’ of any service acquisition and the success or failure of a 
contract is greatly dependent on the quality of the PWS” (2011, p. 32).  The task 
of writing SOWs, SOOs, and PWSs becomes more important for knowledge-
based service contracts; however, it is cumbersome because it often requires a 
combination of tacit and implicit knowledge of the subject. 
In order to define requirements precisely, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the deliverables, or outcomes, contracted for in knowledge-
based service contracts.  The OUSD memorandum, Taxonomy for the 
Acquisition of Services, stressed the need to achieve affordability by clearly 
organizing all the services acquired into six categories as per the PSC manual 
(OUSD, 2010b).  It is essential to have a taxonomy not only for the services, but 
also for the deliverables of the services in order to have a clear and 
comprehensive understanding of what the USAF procures.  While contracting for 
services, an outcome focus is needed to derive cost savings/avoidance 
techniques.  Contracting for knowledge-based services based on titles / PSCs 
and not accounting for the type of deliverables required will have an effect on the 
type of contract used to procure the knowledge-based services.  The selected 
100 contracts showed a substantial variety of deliverables, either tangible or 
intangible.  Some of the tangible deliverables were in-plant technical support, 
facility and equipment management, vehicle management and maintenance, etc.  
Intangible deliverables included workforce training, advisory services, technical 
support through telephone or e-mail, and assistance in source selection. 
Although information processing is an intangible action, its output can easily be 
transformed into a tangible form such as technical reports, studies, analyses and 
evaluation, presentations, briefings, information papers, graphics, etc.   
At present, there is no taxonomy in the DoD or USAF by which to 
categorize these deliverables.  While most of the contracted deliverables directly 
relate to the titles, or labels, of categories (e.g., PSC codes) of services procured, 
making judgments based on categories alone can obfuscate understanding of 
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what exactly is being procured.  For example, a consulting knowledge-based 
service may be classified as a management/professional service.  Without having 
a precisely defined deliverable, this type of requirement may end up as a T&M 
contract.  In this case the outcome is the expertise, experience, knowledge of 
individuals who are on site and are available as needed.  Hence, by 
understanding the difference between a title/label and an outcome, the 
contracting officer could contract for a scoped report or analysis that could be 
done mostly off site and perhaps could be priced as a FFP-type contract rather 
than T&M.   
In an effort to categorize the deliverables of knowledge-based services of 
our selected PSCs, we examined multiple taxonomies and decided to divide the 
deliverables as per Lovelock and Wirtz ‘Four Categories of Services’ model 
(2007, p. 34).  The model was selected because most of the deliverables in 
knowledge-based services are intangible and this model gives a lot of emphasis 
on nature of the service act. The categories in ‘Four Categories of Services’ 
model is referred to as “people processing, possession processing, mental 
stimulus processing and information processing” (Lovelock and Wirtz, 2007, p. 
34).  People processing and possession processing services are tangible actions 
directed towards people’s bodies and physical possessions, respectively 
(Lovelock and Wirtz, 2007).  Whereas mental stimulus processing and 
information processing services are intangible actions directed at people’s minds 
(Lovelock and Wirtz, 2007).  Based on the ‘Four Categories of Services’ model, 




Table 11.   Taxonomy for Deliverables (After Lovelock and Wirtz, 2007) 
  






People   Possessions 
          
Tangible 
Actions 
  1.  People processing (services 
directed at people's bodies):                                              
Recreational services,  Cargo 
movement training 
  2.  Possession processing (services 
directed at physical possessions):                       
Evaluation of engineering/technical 
issues, In-plant technical support, 
Weapon system engineering and 
technical support, Undertaking system 
engineering and integration, Facility and 
equipment management, Vehicle 
management and maintenance, Fuels 
management, Cargo movement, 
Computer networking, Maintenance 
services, Contractor-Inventory Control 
Point (C-ICP) management, 
Programmed Depot Maintenance  
          
Intangible 
Actions 
  3.  Mental stimulus processing 
(services directed at people's 
mind):                                               
Workforce training, Advisory 
services, Technical advisory 
services, Technical support 
through telephone or e-mail, 
Preparation of acquisition 
strategy, Assistance in source 
selection, Arrangement of 
guidance conferences for 
engineering data, Program 
management plans, Logistics 
support plans, quality control 
plans, Configuration 
management plans, Integrated 
master plans, Systems 
engineering management plans, 
Test and evaluation program 
plan, Risk management plans, 
Supply support plans 
  4.  Information processing (services 
directed at intangible assets):                              
Technical Reports, Studies, Analyses and 
evaluation, Papers, Updates to technical 
orders, Status reports, Presentations, 
Briefings, Information papers, Graphics,  
Investigation and resolution of 
anomalies, Hardware/software 
solutions, IT-related services such as 
data rights and files in an appropriate 
format, Qualification testing of 
software, Modification of database, 
Delivery and testing of software 




Additionally, the GAO recently reported in its annual testimony before the 
budget committee to the U.S. Senate that the government has numerous areas 
where it needs to reduce fragmented, overlapping, and duplicated contracting 
efforts (GAO, 2013).  These areas present themselves between federal agencies 
or within the same agency.  Over the past three years, the GAO found over 300 
actions within 131 areas the government could address to achieve cost savings 
such as the USAF renegotiating food service contracts at 18 installations ($2.5 
million annual savings), the DoD consolidating defense foreign language support 
contracts, or the consolidation of support services across 26 joint basing 
locations (GAO, 2013).  If the GAO has identified these broad categories within 
the government where fragmented, duplicated, and overlapping contract actions 
exist, there may be opportunity for the USAF to identify fragmented, duplicated, 
and overlapping contract actions in the purchasing of knowledge-based 
outcomes or deliverables.  A taxonomy of deliverables, similar to Table 11, could 
help the USAF determine what is actually being purchased as opposed to simply 
depicting labor in often vague PSC codes and description fields in FPDS-NG.   
The analysis of the selected 100 contracts also revealed that every buying 
office is involved in the acquisition of a varying range of service types.  For 
instance, the buying office FA0021 at Air Force Special Operations Command 




Table 12.   Breakdown of Selected Air Force Special Operations Command 
Contracts by Contract Type 
 
The data in Table 12 highlights that the AFSOC buying office’s core 
contracting specialty is Program Management/Support Services (R408), which 
constituted 83.33% of the total original contract actions.  However, the remaining 
16.66% of the contracts fell in seven different PSCs.  Consolidation of these 
contracts, if feasible, with another appropriate buying office having their core 
competency in those specialties, could result in significant savings.  The USAF 
has successfully used the concept of commodity councils for acquiring supplies.  
Members of cross-functional commodity councils have deep category expertise.  
They know the services they buy, their cost drivers, the best-in-class suppliers, 
and the current market conditions.  They can eliminate the duplication of effort, 
demonstrate savings through leverage purchasing, and increase the quality of 
goods and services (DoD, 2004).  Decentralized sourcing coupled with the 
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involved in the procurement of services.  This workforce is learning through 
repeatedly committing mistakes at the cost of the tax payers’ dollars.  In order to 
address the skills and competencies of the contracting workforce, DoD has made 
a competency model (GAO, 2007b).  Apart from transactional cost savings, 
consolidation of two knowledge-based contracts to a single geographical location 
where the cost of labor is comparatively less could result in substantial savings.  
During the 13th ISM conference, Dr. Silvia Hodges and Marty Harlow highlighted 
outsourcing of legal services to a region where the cost of consulting was 
cheaper as an example of realizing benefits from this approach.  Consolidating 
services, not tied to a geographic location, coupled with flat fees and personnel 
with appropriate experience, could save the USAF money. 
The SOW of the selected 100 contract actions highlights that obligations 
were comprised of multiple contract line item numbers (CLINs) pertaining to 
different PSCs within a single contract action.  However, the FPDS–NG spend 
data recorded the obligation against a single PSC, usually according to the 
highest dollar-value CLIN.  Because many different types of services (PSCs) are 
often included in the same contract and coded under a single PSC, the FPDS–
NG obligation data distorts the true dollar values spent in each service category.  
The impact of this anomaly magnifies for an agency like the USAF, which had 
147,222 contract actions in FY2010. 
The sample data also showed that several legal statutes, including the 
Economy Act, Services Contract Act, and Walsh Healy Act, bound 60% of the 
contracts.  Although the Walsh Healy Act applies to the acquisition of supplies, 
our sample data revealed 31% of the original knowledge-based services 
contracts fell under this act.  The presence of this act in knowledge-based 
service contracts depicts supplies purchased under a knowledge-based service 
contract.  Purchasing supplies within a services contract may deny the USAF 
leverage in spending it could achieve through the appropriate commodity council.  
This highlights a limitation in the contracting system whereby the contracting 
officer is bound to record a multiple CLIN contract under a single PSC.  Thus, 
anyone examining the data may not be able to discern what the USAF bought 
without opening the actual contract or SOW. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA 
The purpose of this study was to explore whether and how the USAF 
could improve efficiency in sourcing knowledge-based services by instituting for-
profit sector best practices in strategic sourcing.  To address the purpose of this 
research, our research team conducted a literature review and multiple 
interviews with subject-matter experts to identify best practices used in the for-
profit and not-for-profit sectors.  Our literature review identified 22 best practices 
of strategic sourcing used in a CAPS Research project examining 119 for-profit 
sector organizations (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Additionally, the GAO (2002) 
identified four basic best practices applied to six for-profit sector firms that 
resulted in substantial savings and many service improvements.  Finally, our 
interviews identified seven best practices the for-profit sector informants currently 
utilize to acquire knowledge-based services.  
Our team solicited 99 participants in support of this research project.  We 
contacted every acquisition professional via e-mail or telephone resulting in 11 
interviews over a three-month period.  Despite the lack of participation and 
lengthy questionnaire, our team achieved an 11% participation rate, which is 
within the 10–15% average external survey participation rate (Sacks, 2010).  
Table 13 depicts the participation rates, method of interview, and sector from the 
four methods of soliciting participants. 





























13th Annual ISM 
Services 
Conference 42 3 7% 1 2 2 1 
Naval 
Postgraduate 
School Faculty 3 1 33% 1 0 0 1 
CAPS Research 
Affiliates 44 4 9% 3 1 4 0 
Not-for-Profit 
Social Network 9 2 22% 1 1 0 2 
For-Profit Social 
Network 1 1 100% 0 1 1 0 
Total 99 11 11% 6 5 7 4 
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Because our spend analysis focused on five PSCs within the knowledge-
based services category, it was important to interview at least one person from 
the for-profit sector and one person from the not-for-profit sector for each 
respective PSC.  Representation of an interviewee from almost every PSC 
enabled us to correlate the interview data to the spend data to answer our 
research questions and to support our recommendations within each category.  
Table 14 reflects the interview participants within each respective PSC. 
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of the Army 
1. Interview Best Practices 
Implementing best practices with respect to purchasing knowledge-based 
services is different for each firm.  In order to gain insight into some of the best 
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practices the for-profit sector is currently using, we included an open-ended 
interview question that allowed the for-profit sector informants an opportunity to 
explain the best practices they were currently using.  Although not all inclusive of 
what the for-profit sector is utilizing when it comes to the procurement of 
services, our results revealed seven best practices discussed later in this chapter 
under Section D (Answers to Research Questions): 
a. conducting spend analysis, 
b. demand management, 
c. contract consolidation, 
d. use of preferred partners, 
e. electronic reverse auctioning, 
f. cost containment, and 
g. e-sourcing.  
2. Constraints in Implementation of Tenets/Best Practices 
As with any major decision that organizations face, there are usually 
constraints that prevent or limit the outcome.  Both the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors face many constraints when it comes to the procurement of services.  
During our interviews, the for-profit sector informants identified multiple 
constraints they face when it comes to purchasing services: 
1. Internal departments within an organization must compete for limited 
resources to source requirements. 
2. Internal departments are not using their procurement departments to 
source services. 
3. Organizations must deal with last-minute emergency requirements 
or lack of planning. 
4. Organizations must manage services within condensed workweeks 
where they have only about 30 of 52 full weeks of usable time. 
5. The organization has monetary policies on how money is spent 
6. The organization has budgetary constraints. 
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Although some of the above constraints fall within the not-for-profit sector 
constraints as well, the not-for-profit sector faces additional constraints that do 
not pertain to the for-profit sector: 
1. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA): 41 U.S.C. 253 is a 
public law enacted for the purpose of encouraging competition for 
awarding all government contracts by increasing the number of 
competitors and realizing cost savings through lower, more 
competitive pricing.  It requires full and open competition for 
contracts unless exempt, as per FAR part 6. 
2. The FAR: unified policies and procedures for procurement that all 
executive agencies must follow. 
3. Bid protests: legal process in which an interested party may contest 
the procedure or outcome of a government contract award. 
4. Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA): requirement for contractors to 
submit certified cost and pricing data for negotiated procurements 
above $750,000. 
5. Other federal and department regulations/policies/directives. 
6. Socioeconomic set-asides: requirements to set-aside a certain 
percentage of contracts for award to small business concerns. 
7. Buy America Act: preferred use of U.S. made products in 
procurements. 
8. Berry Amendment: preferred use of domestically produced, 
manufactured, or home-grown products. 
9. Fiscal law (time, purpose, amount): requirement to purchase only for 
appropriated amount, within the allotted time, and must be a bona 
fide need. 
10. Oversight: regulations/policies/directives require additional 
personnel to manage contracts from requirement through closeout. 
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3. Management of Knowledge-Based Service Contracts 
As noted in the literature review, both the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors have increased the use of knowledge-based service contracts.  The 
increased use of knowledge-based services is causing a shortage of knowledge-
based workers.  The McKinsey Global Institute predicts that there will be a 13% 
shortage in demand by 2020 (Dewhurst et al., 2013).  Although outsourcing 
knowledge-based services can save money and fill capability gaps, it can also 
cause an organization to lose valuable tacit knowledge if not captured from the 
personnel who are performing those knowledge-based services.  Our interviews 
revealed that eight of 11 interviewees from the for-profit sector and not-for-profit 
sector track the spending of knowledge-based services.  Only one of seven for-
profit sector interviewees has an online IT knowledge system to retain procured 
tacit knowledge, whereas none of the not-for-profit sector interviewees has an IT 
system used to store and organize procured tacit knowledge.  The only 
knowledge captured by all the interviewees is in the form of SOWs, PWSs, 
SOOs, standard operating procedures (SOPs), processes, policies, or training. 
Although not necessarily the contracting officer’s job to retain tacit 
knowledge used in the performance of knowledge-based service contracts, 
knowledge loss created by outsourcing may have serious implications.  For 
example, the Australian Navy blamed its government for policy changes, the 
downsizing of uniformed personnel, and the excessive outsourcing, which 
resulted in the loss of knowledge-based skills (Bushnell, 2011).  This has been 
identified as contributing factors as to why three supply ships were unable to 
perform a recovery mission after a cyclone (Bushnell, 2011).  Another example 
stems from a Fortune 500 company who dismissed a bookkeeper earning $9 an 
hour (Massingham, 2008).  Since the company failed to document the tacit and 
explicit knowledge the bookkeeper used on a daily basis, they were unable to 
answer important questions which resulted in hiring the bookkeeper back as a 
consultant at $42 an hour (Massingham, 2008).  This net loss of $33 an hour 
countered the cost saving measures the Fortune 500 company was trying to 
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accomplish by downsizing.  The USAF must ensure that it is retaining 
competency in all areas of knowledge-based spending, whether to perform the 
task organically or the ability to manage and perform the outsourced task.  If the 
USAF must insource a previously outsourced knowledge-based service but fails 
to retain the tacit knowledge, then the USAF may find itself struggling to perform 
knowledge-based services. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Although knowledge-based services are only one of the six types of 
services, they account for a major portion of service spending and provide a 
substantial opportunity for cost savings.  This is evident from the fact that DoD 
spending on knowledge-based services is steadily increasing.  Between FY2005 
and FY2011, the DoD increased the use of knowledge-based services from 
$28.3 billion to $45.2 billion (DPAP, 2012; GAO, 2007a).  Knowledge-based 
services constitute a vast portion within PAMS, as categorized by the CSIS 
(Berteau et al., 2012).  The FY2010 USAF spend data showed an obligation of 
$9.7 billion on knowledge-based services, which is 37.82% of total spending on 
acquisition of services (FPDS-NG, 2010). 
During this time of financial constraints after the materialization of 
sequestration, the DoD must use the obligated dollars in the most efficient 
manner.  Due to the peculiar characteristics of the services, the DoD is unable to 
quantify the output of services in terms of their contribution to the overall mission.  
Knowledge-based services are a major part of the total services that the DoD has 
acquired; however, the DoD is currently unable to determine how much savings 
can be attained in this area.  Despite evolving DoD policies, there is currently no 
cost-saving/avoidance framework or set of best practices for knowledge-based 
service contracts.  We developed eight research questions (RQs) with the 
purpose of identifying for-profit–sector best practices and original ideas that the 
USAF could implement in the strategic sourcing of knowledge-based service 
contracts.  The eight research questions and respective results are listed below. 
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RQ 1.  What are the relevant tenets of strategic sourcing? 
Although the USAF has already implemented some of the 22 CAPS 
Research and four GAO tenets of strategic sourcing, our team focused on 11 
relevant tenets that the USAF could work on to enhance its strategic sourcing of 
services.  The most widely utilized tenet of strategic sourcing begins with 
conducting a spend analysis of which all other tenets flow and is the beginning 
and the end to the seven-step strategic sourcing process.  Additionally, eight of 
11 interviewees track the spend within their organization.  We explained all 22 
CAPS Research and four GAO tenets in detail in the literature review: 
1. Knowledge of Service Spending (Spend Analysis): Organizations 
that want to gain or maintain a competitive advantage must 
understand how they are spending their money.  Conducting a 
spend analysis allows an organization to collect, classify, and 
analyze their expenditure data in order to reduce procurement costs 
and improve efficiency while maintaining effectiveness.  Many 
organizations do not conduct spend analyses because they do not 
have spend data readily available or because it takes too long to 
retrieve the data.  The interviewee from the global engineering 
company “employs a spend analysis tool and data cleansing service 
that take the spend from multiple different systems and normalize 
the spend for analysis” (Procurement officer, personal 
communication, March 5, 2013).  In a 2004 GAO report, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs realized a $394 million cost 
reduction in pharmaceutical procurement in one year after 
conducting a spend analysis.  In 2003, the state of Georgia used 
spend analysis to identify inefficiencies to help resolve a $600 
million deficit (Pennington, 2011).  By implementing an enterprise-
wide approach to shared administrative services like procurement, 
fleet management, and risk management, the state of Georgia was 
able to realize an annual cost savings of over $100 million 
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(Pennington, 2011).  The USAF currently utilizes spend analysis as 
a cost savings measure; however, lack of human resources and 
inaccurate or incomplete data make it difficult for all buying offices 
within the USAF to utilize spend analysis to its full potential.  
Recently, a team from the USAF knowledge-based service council 
tried to use spend data to determine deliverables based on PSCs 
but found it difficult because they had to open every contract to 
determine the deliverables; and even then, the PWS often depicted 
undefined requirements (Director of the USAF knowledge-based 
services Council, personal communication, April, 22, 2013).  
Additionally, our research team attempted to utilize the spend data 
to determine the deliverables and cost drivers of 100 contracts and 
found it difficult to locate deeply embedded data that was often 
unavailable or unclear.  The DoD should create a taxonomy of 
deliverables associated with all services that would provide a more 
finite level of detail of what is actually being spent and that is easier 
to access. 
2. Strategic Cost Management: Much like demand management, 
strategic cost management requires the development of strategies 
to identify and manage all costs and cost drivers that could be 
controlled, reduced, or eliminated pertaining to design, quality, 
inventory, transportation, and disposal costs associated throughout 
the life cycle of the product or service (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  
A careful analysis of these categories could result in the 
identification of a substitute material or service, consolidation of 
transportation assets, better inventory management procedures, or 
a means of recycling that could result in cost savings without 
sacrificing quality.  One interviewee stated, “Whenever we scope a 
project, we ask if there is a way to get work done with fewer 
resources or hours.  We are sensitive to “over-buying” and seek to 
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always “right size” any purchase” (Global Strategic Sourcing 
manager, personnel communication, March 15, 2013).  Many 
educational institutions where instructors provide online interactive 
classes have realized cost savings by eliminating the physical space 
required to house students without sacrificing the quality of 
education.  Despite these cost saving measures, the USAF should 
explore the use of strategic cost management in sourcing 
knowledge-based services to reduce costs by purchasing defined 
deliverables instead of labor hours where possible.  Additionally, the 
USAF should look at all levels of its spend data because 
organizations tend to focus on the largest categories of spend when 
implementing strategic cost management; however, the best cost 
saving opportunities often result from the smaller categories of 
spend (ATKearney, 2003).  The USAF should apply demand 
management levers such as eliminating demand, reducing quantity, 
simplifying specifications, reducing frequency, encouraging 
substitution, imposing tighter process and tracking, increasing cost 
awareness, and tightening policies (ATKearny, 2003). 
3. Human Resource Development: Organizations must figure out how 
to attract, acquire, train, develop, and retain acquisition personnel in 
order to preserve the tacit knowledge and competitive advantage.  
Keeping the right balance of knowledge-based workers can be a 
challenge if resources are unavailable.  Leaders must be flexible to 
the needs of the ever-changing and dynamic workforce.  One study 
suggests flexible hours, hiring a mixture of part-time and full-time 
employees, allowing for remote workers, commissions, bonuses, 
and vacation benefits to aid in the retention of knowledge-based 
workers (Lund et al., 2012).  Another study suggests cross-training, 
mentoring programs, exiting checklists, healthcare packages, 
generous salaries for part-time employees, and the flexibility for 
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retirees to be hired as consultants, mentors, and trainers of new 
employees to help balance the workforce (Krumrie & Lynch, 2006).  
The USAF is currently facing a loss of potential knowledge and 
experience in its civil service acquisition workforce due to the 
workforce reduction at the end of the Cold War and current hiring 
freeze.  The USAF should create a pilot program that allows its 
leaders the flexibility to develop and tailor retention plans based on 
suggestions and innovative ideas from current leadership and the 
above-mentioned studies.  Failure to retain knowledge workers or 
their tacit knowledge may result in new employees using up valuable 
resources to exploit the previously lost tact knowledge. 
4. Total Cost of Ownership: Much like strategic cost management, 
TCO allows an organization to identify the relevant costs and cost 
drivers of buying a product or service form a supplier (Ellram & 
Siferd, 1998).  TCO includes all direct and indirect costs incurred 
throughout the life cycle of an item, comprising research and 
development, procurement, operations and maintenance, and 
disposal (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Proper TCO analysis could 
help to identify and eliminate costs not associated with the final 
product, such as calculating the cost of crewmembers into the total 
cost of a replacement aircraft because these crewmembers are not 
managing the research, development, operations, maintenance, or 
disposal of the aircraft.  One issue the USAF has in conducting a 
proper TCO analysis is that it does not account for all the 
government personnel costs associated with acquisition and 
procurement, operations and maintenance, and disposition.  The 
USAF should begin utilizing proper TCO analysis by including the 
contracting overhead costs related to transaction costs of all 
acquisitions in order to justify the need for an increased workforce.  
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Additionally TCO will help in identifying the true cost of managing a 
program/contract from requirement development to disposal. 
5. Supplier Assessment, Measurement, and Communications: 
Organizations should develop metrics to evaluate a supplier’s 
performance, strategies, and processes to gauge performance 
against specified objectives (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  
Presenting clearly defined performance metrics up front to a supplier 
can reduce the risk of sub-standard performance.  One for-profit 
interviewee who works for a food production and distribution 
company developed a monthly scorecard to track the key 
performance indicators by location regarding the varying levels of 
water services, energy services, chemical services, pest services, 
and sanitation services.  Another for-profit interviewee who works for 
an assisted living company uses a quarterly vendor review to track 
current clientele, sales, and subjective questions like what value the 
vendor is bringing to the organization, how the vendor is going to 
maintain its relationship with the organization, and what its IT 
infrastructure can support.  Both interviewees perform these 
evaluations face to face with the contractor so that issues on behalf 
of the organization and the contractor can be resolved quickly with 
little interference of day-to-day operations.  The USAF already uses 
metrics such as performance evaluations and quality assurance 
surveillance plans to track knowledge-based services that are 
monitored by contracting officer representatives (COR); however, 
lack of training, time, technical expertise, and oversight often allows 
contractors to complete substandard services (GAO, 2012a) 
undetected.  The USAF should consider making CORs a permanent 
position instead of a secondary job so that they can dedicate their 
efforts solely to conducting evaluations and providing feedback to 
the contractor in order to eliminate the waste of time and money due 
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to incomplete or substandard work.  Although these permanent COR 
positions may increase personnel costs, properly implemented 
performance metrics can lead to increased efficiencies while still 
maintaining effectiveness. 
6. Cross-Functional/Location Teaming: Before making large or 
complex purchasing decisions, an organization should attempt to 
gather expert personnel from across appropriate departments to 
work in tandem to develop purchasing strategies (Monczka & 
Peterson, 2011).  One interviewee stated, “When a category is 
sourced for the first time, we do extensive research into our supplier 
database to determine where all of the usage is currently occurring.  
This allows us to coordinate all the key users of the services and 
leverage the spend across the company” (Global Strategic Sourcing 
manager, personal communication, March 15, 2013).  The USAF 
uses integrated product and process development (IPPD) teams to 
gather the correct personnel in the planning and purchasing of major 
acquisitions such as aircraft, weapon systems, and satellite 
programs.  Additionally, the USAF developed commodity councils 
for commodities and services that are purchased by many activities 
across the entire department to aid in strategic sourcing.  Without 
these strategies, many major acquisitions may not be as efficient 
and effective due to wasted time, human capital, and overhead 
costs associated with the learning process.  The USAF should 
continue to utilize teaming with internal buying offices as well as 
other DoD buying offices to collaborate and develop strategies for 
the procurement of knowledge-based services.  Additionally, the 
Under Secretary of Defense directed each component to establish a 
senior service manager responsible for planning, execution, 
strategic sourcing, and management of service contracts (Kendall, 
2013). 
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7. Supplier Integration into New Product/Process/Service 
Development: An organization can help eliminate wasted resources 
up front and strengthen the supplier/buyer relationship.  The DoD 
encourages the use of performance-based specifications where the 
supplier develops a requirement from the government without the 
government telling the supplier exactly how to develop the 
requirement.  Supplier integration into development provides 
suppliers with the opportunity to display their innovate ideas for 
bringing a product or service to fruition.  Supplier involvement in the 
development phase of a product or service can increase quality, 
reduce purchase costs and total lifecycle costs, and improve 
product- or service-to-market time (McGinnis & Vallopra, 1999).  The 
USAF utilizes this approach in over 10 of its major acquisition 
programs such as the Globemaster III Advanced Cargo Aircraft (C-
17A) and the B-2 Radar Modernization Program as well as over 25 
joint major acquisition programs.  The USAF could also implement a 
similar approach like the Army’s Network Integration Evaluations 
where the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors bring together 
contracted technology and services for testing by the soldier.  This 
approach allows the for-profit industry participants to see how 
commercial items are integrated into the military.  Additionally, the 
for-profit participants may identify improvements, new technology, 
and service requirements.  
8. Standardization of Products, Services, Components, and Design 
Specifications: Standardizing common knowledge-based services 
and collaborating with other buying offices can help to realize cost 
savings.  Automobile manufacturers standardize maintenance 
service packages to support the manufacturer’s warranties and 
alleviate dealer inconsistencies.  The USAF takes advantage of 
standardization by purchasing standardized cellular phone packages 
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across the entire continental United States.  Although it is easy to 
standardize service in certain categories, knowledge-based services 
may prove to be a challenge.  Currently, the USAF is developing a 
framework to categorize similar knowledge-based services for basic 
installation services but has found it difficult due to the lack of 
adequate spend data and undefined requirements within the SOWs.  
The USAF should consider developing a standardized taxonomy of 
outcomes and deliverables associated with all purchased 
knowledge-based services – similar to the taxonomy provided 
herein.  This taxonomy could help the USAF eliminate the practice 
of purchasing labor hours for undefined knowledge-based services 
by purchasing defined knowledge-based deliverables such as 
market research, past performance inquiry, contract close-out, 
auditing, cost & pricing analysis, and editing services.   
9. Enabled Success through Sustained Leadership, Communication, 
and Metrics: A 2002 GAO report indicated the lack of top 
management buy-in as the root of many restructuring failures.  
Additionally, Georgia state officials realized that they needed to get 
involved in their restructuring process when employees could not 
provide adequate solutions to their customers’ feedback 
(Pennington, 2011).  Because most organizations have such a 
diverse workforce with different backgrounds, interests, ethnicity, 
tenure, and value systems, it is imperative for organizations to have 
top leadership engagement at all times, open lines of 
communication, and constant follow-up on strategies for strategic 
sourcing of knowledge-based services.  The USAF not only faces 
these challenges, but must also cope with the turnover of civilian, 
military, and contract employees who are constantly moving from 
one position to another for career progression.  The USAF already 
conducts employee evaluations, training, and integration programs 
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to ensure that all employees understand their role within the 
organization.  However, the USAF should capitalize on the 
knowledge and innovation of its workforce by developing an 
incentive program.  The program should not only reward employees 
for implementing leadership policies and procedures, but also 
challenge them to go beyond to seek out better ways to gain 
efficiencies while still being effective when contracting for 
knowledge-based services.  The USAF leadership is currently 
supporting an initiative at Wright Patterson Air Force Base to 
effectively source installation-level knowledge-based services to 
eliminate buying undefined labor requirements and replace them 
with deliverables.  Although this new program may be a great 
accomplishment, it will not survive if leadership does not understand 
it, enforce it, and engage with the workforce that must use it. 
10. Strategic Insourcing/Outsourcing (Make or Buy): Before 
organizations make any purchasing decisions, they should “evaluate 
internal capabilities, competencies, and capacity verses external 
sources and capabilities to identify opportunities to better focus on 
core competencies, improve product/service differentiation, and 
develop and sustain competitive advantage” (Monczka & Peterson, 
2011).  Organizations that wish to outsource should ensure that they 
retain the knowledge of the position they are outsourcing, as well as 
understand how to manage the outsourced position.  One for-profit 
interviewee stated, “We always compare the cost of insourcing 
verses outsourcing when we are determining a sourcing strategy for 
services” (Global Strategic Sourcing manager, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013).  Another for-profit interviewee 
stated, “It depends on the specific services and application on a 
project or with the corporate entity.  The method is not characterized 
by preference” (Procurement officer, personal communication, 
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March 5, 2013).  The USAF adds an additional step in this make-or-
buy decision where they must also ensure that they do not 
outsource positions that are inherently governmental.  The USAF 
should take time to analyze the price of a federal employee vis-à-vis 
the cost of outsourcing and managing that employee because the 
federal employee can often be more flexible and require less 
oversight (Project on Government Oversight [POGO], 2013).  In 
2011, POGO conducted a cost benefit analysis between federal and 
contract employees in 35 employment categories (2013).  There 
results revealed that on average, a contract employee earns 1.83 
times more in total compensation as opposed to a federal employee 
and in 33 of the 35 categories the federal employees were less 
expensive (POGO, 2013).  Table 15 depicts knowledge-based 
services that POGO analyzed that were closely associated with the 
five PSCs we analyzed in this research. Out of these knowledge-
based services, a contractor earns on average 1.76 times more than 
a federal employee.  In light of sequestration, the DoD should force 
every requiring activity to scrub 100% of contracts in knowledge-
based services and report:  how it contributes to mission, how long it 
has lasted and will last, and alternatives for getting the same/similar 
result with less money, then build in incentives to reduce (e.g., more 
manning or more budget next year) this spend. 
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Table 15.   Cost Analysis of Federal vs. Contractor Employee Compensation 












Engineering  $          136,456   $          268,653  1.97 
Contracting  $          113,319   $          259,106  2.29 
Logistics 
Management  $          116,147   $          168,938  1.46 
Mechanical 
Engineering  $          126,177   $          189,197  1.50 
Program 
Management  $          173,551   $          269,901  1.56 
Average  $          133,130   $          231,159  1.76 
 
11. Collaborative Buyer/Supplier Development and Continuous 
Improvement.  An organization can build a supplier alliance by 
collaborating and developing the supply network and constantly 
seeking improvement (Monczka & Peterson, 2011).  Organizations 
should continuously use metrics to improve not only their own 
processes and procedures, but that of their suppliers as well.  
Developing joint relationships highlights improvements, joint 
resources, and the sharing of risks and rewards (Monczka & 
Peterson, 2011).  Taking the time to develop a supplier can be 
beneficial in the long term but may also pay off in the short term if an 
organization needs something expedited.  One of the for-profit 
interviewees uses his quarterly vendor reviews as a way of providing 
feedback to the supplier as well as soliciting feedback as a means of 
collaborative development.  The USAF could use this strategy to 
post a well-known, currently sole source, knowledge-based service 
requirement for future awards well in advance so that the supply 
base could prepare for the requirement.  Commodity councils should 
advertise such requirements and be required to include strategies or 
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efforts taken 12 months out from the need to thwart a sole source 
monopoly.  This approach could spark competition and ultimately 
produce cost savings. 
RQ 2.  What are commercial best practices in sourcing knowledge-based 
services? 
Many organizations are constantly looking for ways to improve the bottom 
line or get the best value for their money, and because each organization’s focus 
is different, there are multiple commercial best practices in relation to the 
procurement of knowledge-based services.  Although not all-inclusive, our 
interviews resulted in seven for-profit sector best practices: 
1. Conducting Spend Analysis: The first best practice identified during 
the for-profit sector interviews requires an organization to conduct a 
spend analysis.  For an organization to determine inefficiencies in 
their procurement processes, they must be able to understand how 
they are spending their money.  A proper spend analysis highlights 
redundancies for elimination and/or consolidation.  Many 
organizations do not conduct spend analyses because they do not 
have spend data readily available or because it takes too long to 
retrieve the data.  The interviewee from the global engineering 
company “employs a spend analysis tool and data cleansing service 
that take the spend from multiple different systems and normalize 
the spend for analysis” (Procurement officer, personal 
communication, March 5, 2013).  In a 2004 GAO report, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs realized a $394 million cost 
reduction in pharmaceutical procurement in one year after 
conducting a spend analysis.  The USAF had approximately 125 
employees involved in cross-functional strategic sourcing to 
leverage spend across 71 sites (GAO, 2012c).  The USAF currently 
utilizes spend analysis as a cost savings measure; however, lack of 
human resources and inaccurate and incomplete data make it 
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difficult for all buying offices within the USAF to utilize spend 
analysis to its full potential.  Recently, a team from the USAF 
knowledge-based service council tried to use spend data to 
determine deliverables based on PSCs but found it difficult because 
they had to open every contract to determine the deliverables, and 
even then, the PWS often depicted undefined requirements (Director 
of the USAF knowledge-based services Council, personal 
communication, April, 22, 2013). 
2. Demand Management: Although a spend analysis can reduce costs 
by identifying opportunities to consolidate contracts and eliminate 
redundancies, demand management goes one step further and 
looks at the consumption.  Demand management requires an 
organization to look at the commodities and services they are 
consuming to determine what they can reduce, eliminate, or 
substitute.  One of the for-profit interviewees conducts a meeting 
every Monday with all managers to review the previous week’s 
accomplishments.  He stated, “My main job is to look at Excel 
spreadsheets and forecast what services we need to be ready to 
manage internally and how many new vendors we need to manage 
externally” (Executive director, personal communication, February 
14, 2013).  Another interviewee stated, “Whenever we scope a 
project, we ask if there is a way to get work done with fewer 
resources or hours.  We also look at standardization as a way to 
reduce the risk of overbuying or driving the price up.  We are 
sensitive to ‘over-buying’ and seek to always ‘right size’ any 
purchase” (Global Strategic Sourcing manager, personnel 
communication, March 15, 2013).  Another for-profit organization 
used demand management to reduce travel expenditures by 
requiring a 14-day booking notice, restricting travelers to economy 
hotels, booking through an online system, and even replacing 
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unnecessary travel with video teleconferencing ( ATKearney, 2003).  
Sequestration recently forced the NPS students and faculty to 
reduce the number of personnel travelling, restricted conferences, 
and required researchers to find alternatives for participating in 
events.  The USAF used demand management to reduce product 
costs and associated maintenance services by replacing existing 
incandescent airfield lighting with light-emitting diode lighting 
(Quinter, 2012).  Additionally, the USAF used demand management 
to standardize specifications and service levels for the custodial, 
grounds maintenance, and solid waste management to ensure that 
all installations receive the same level of services within budgetary 
constraints (Armstrong, 2008).  Despite these cost-saving 
measures, the USAF should explore the use of demand 
management in sourcing knowledge-based services to reduce cost 
by purchasing deliverables instead of labor hours for undefined 
requirements.  Additionally, the USAF should look at all levels of its 
spend data because organizations tend to focus on the largest 
categories of spend when implementing demand management; 
however, the best cost-saving opportunities often result from the 
smaller categories of spend (ATKearney, 2003). 
3. Contract Consolidation: Many organizations have multiple buying 
offices that purchase the same services at different locations.  
Additionally, organizations inadvertently use multiple contracts for 
the same service.  Organizations that consolidate multiple contracts 
within the same buying office or across multiple buying offices can 
avoid transaction costs (e.g., source selection effort and associated 
procurement lead-time, payment processing, closeouts, etc.) and 
often obtain a lower price from economies of scale.  The USAF, as 
well as other DoD components, already uses BPAs and IDIQ 
contracts to eliminate redundancies caused by multiple contracts for 
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the same item.  Despite these efforts, there are still many 
opportunities for the USAF to consolidate service contracts within 
and across contracting offices.  Although centrally located, our 
FY2010 spend analysis revealed that multiple buying offices at 
Wright–Patterson Air Force Base were purchasing knowledge-based 
services within the same PSC.  Contract consolidation among these 
multiple buying offices could potentially reduce contractor 
transaction costs associated with multiple contracts.  Additionally, 
the development of a taxonomy of common deliverables for each 
PSC could allow for the consolidation of deliverables for services, 
such as legal that include court reporting, legal records collection, 
and discovery.  While at the 13th ISM conference, Dr. Silvia Hodges 
and Marty Harlow identified geographic location, experience of legal 
personnel, and the lack of flat rate deliverables as the main cost 
drivers of legal fees.  To combat these cost drivers, Marty Harlow 
obtained buy-in from his general counsel, began benchmarking best 
practices, started contracting with other geographically located law 
firms to obtain a lower prices, and began purchasing deliverables 
instead of paying by the hour.  Consolidating legal services not tied 
to a geographic location coupled with flat fees and personnel with 
appropriate experience could save the USAF money. 
4. Use of Preferred Partners: Another best practice one for-profit sector 
informant utilizes is the use of preferred partners when contracting 
for knowledge-based services such as marketing, advertising, and 
IT services.  This for-profit organization begins with developing 
confidentiality agreements, followed by the use of a vendor 
qualification document.  The vendor qualification document consists 
of the Dun & Bradstreet number, current clientele, sales, and 
subjective questions like what value the vendor is bringing to the 
organization, how the vendor is going to maintain its relationship 
 100 
with the for-profit organization, and what the IT infrastructure can 
support.  Through market research, past performance, and the 
vendor qualification document, the for-profit organization determines 
three to five qualified vendors to develop knowledge-based service 
requirements.  The qualified vendor documents are then updated 
every quarter using a four-quadrant worksheet to determine key 
projects, deliverables, latest industry best practices, performance 
metrics, and the level of IT system interaction.  Over time, the for-
profit organization and preferred vendors develop trusting 
relationships that foster an environment of collaboration that seeks 
to be innovative and efficient while still being effective.  Using 
qualified vendors in long-term relationships can often keep prices 
down because suppliers realize cost savings through win–win 
relationships and learning curves.  Although the USAF uses long-
term contracts for major defense acquisitions, research and 
development, and some new construction projects, they are limited 
to one-year contracts for most services with opportunities for option 
years.  Option years can often keep prices low, but extended 
contracts can also eliminate suppliers from the industrial base, 
which could ultimately drive prices up.  Additionally, the USAF could 
use an award term incentive contract that allows the contractor to 
extend the contract without having to recompete the contract as 
often.  The USAF must carefully consider the appropriate length and 
type of contract used to procure services in order to gain efficiencies 
while being effective and retaining the industrial base.  The USAF 
should examine using an award term incentive contract for sourcing 
knowledge-based services that would not decimate the industrial 
base.  An award term incentive contract creates an environment for 
contractors conducive to capital investment and process 
improvement, promotes their stability, and enables them to reduce 
 101 
transaction costs over the span of the contract (Stevens & Yoder, 
2005).  It also affords the government the ability to reduce the risk of 
protest, time, and transaction costs for the government to 
continuously compete requirements (Stevens & Yoder, 2005). 
5. Electronic Reverse Auctioning (eRA): Another cost-savings measure 
the for-profit sector uses is eRA.  eRA is a bidding process used via 
the internet that allows suppliers to bid on solicitations in real-time.  
“Agencies should require the use of eRAs where they are 
appropriate: for noncritical and leverage spend where competition is 
ample, requirements are well defined and few changes are 
expected, dependence on the supplier is low, and the need to 
collaborate with the supplier is low” (Hawkins, 2012, p. 33).  
Hawkins’ research on the use of eRAs by 145 Fortune 500 
companies found an average cost savings of 20%; (2012).  He also 
highlighted how the DoD is forgoing at least $12 billion by not 
utilizing eRAs (Hawkins, 2012).  eRA allows an organization to get 
the lowest price contract by having suppliers bid against each other 
in real time.  Although this works in some cases, some of our 
interviewees said that they choose not to use reverse auctioning 
because often the suppliers bid too low and are unable to complete 
the contract or the completed work is substandard.  Despite the 
USAF using eRA for commodities and services when feasible, the 
USAF should determine the appropriateness of using eRAs (Coyne, 
Hawkins, and Hudgens, 2010).  Figure 10 depicts the eRA 
appropriateness model to determine the amount of competition, how 
well the requirement is defined, leadership influence, price based 
selection criteria, type of spend, expected savings and 
attractiveness (Coyne et al, 2010).  Using eRA to source knowledge-
based services may not yield much savings due to standardized 
labor rates and the fact that the USAF does not account for 
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transactional costs.  However, if the USAF develops a taxonomy of 
common deliverables within the knowledge-based PCSs, like market 
research, past performance inquiry, contract close-out, auditing, cost 
& pricing analysis, and editing services, they may realize savings 
through purchasing an outcome instead of purchasing labor. 
 
Figure 10.  eRA Appropriateness Model (From Coyne et al, 2010) 
6. Cost Containment: Also known as strategic cost management 
identified as one of the 22 tenets of strategic sourcing and similar to 
demand management, cost containment is another best practice 
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identified during the for-profit sector interviews.  Cost containment is 
simply finding inefficiencies or cost drivers within an organization, 
project, program, or contract that can be controlled, substituted, or 
eliminated without terminating the requirement, such as using video 
tele-conferencing to reduce travel costs, allowing personnel to work 
from home to eliminate overhead, or installing sensor lights to 
reduce energy costs.  Cost containment can help reduce the TCO 
within a program.  The USAF constantly uses cost containment in 
major acquisition programs because both the USAF and the 
contractor need to hold close to the cost, schedule, and 
performance measures of the program to avoid a Nun-McCurdy 
breech and possible program termination.  Although the USAF uses 
cost containment in TCO, it does not account for the government 
employee costs associated with the contracting process.  Not 
accounting for all direct and indirect costs associated with the cost of 
contracts does not accurately reflect the true cost of a program or 
contract.  All of our for-profit interviewees account for both 
contracting and contractor employee expenses associated with the 
sourcing of services.  The not-for-profit sector, specifically the 
interviewee from the Department of Energy, accounts for both 
contracting and contractor expenses.  One study applied cost 
containment to waste services.  The study identified many cost 
drivers such as collection frequency, type/amount of trash, distance 
to landfill, price of fuel, cost of disposal, maintenance of trucks, and 
labor hours (Hawkins, et al, 2012).  By applying cost containment, 
remedies such as the use of hybrid/electric trucks, automatic side-
loading trucks, automatic sorting machines, and a pick-up schedule 
based on demand where a few of the cost saving measures 
revealed that would reduce the manpower costs while still providing 
a service (Hawkins, et al, 2012)  
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7. E-Sourcing: Another best practice identified from the for-profit sector 
interviews is the use of e-sourcing.  E-sourcing involves a web-
based platform used to post requests for information (RFIs), 
requests for quotes (RFQs), RFP, request for solutions (RFSs), 
requests for market research, award contracts, conduct contract 
administration, and contract close-out.  E-sourcing can save time, 
allow for competition, and provides an easy means of 
communicating requirements from solicitation to payment.  The for-
profit sector has access to a plethora of e-sourcing programs to 
include full service online sourcing and spend analyst groups like EC 
Sourcing, ScanMarket, and Bravo Solution.  The USAF, as well as 
other DoD components, currently uses FBO to advertise RFIs, 
RFOs, and RFPs.  Additionally, the USAF utilizes an online suite 
called AFWay for a limited variety of supplies.  Using E-Sourcing to 
source knowledge-based services in the USAF can provide 
electronic information available to all procurement personnel that 
can be used for future contracts.  E-Sourcing can also help with 
market research to determine how many buyers and suppliers are 
purchasing the same service.  E-Sourcing can also be used to train 
personnel off-line without corrupting actual data.  Finally, E-Sourcing 
provides spend data; however, since the deliverables under each 
USAF contract are not coded separately and accounted for within 
the actual contract, the spend data that comes from the E-Sourcing 
platform is often inaccurate.  Proper coding could allow the USAF to 
possibly source common deliverables instead of purchasing labor as 
well as provide accurate data on what the USAF is actually spending 
as opposed to general categories. 
RQ 3.  What are the constraints, if any, of applying the commercial best 
practices in the USAF context? 
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Constraints can be difficult to overcome in the USAF because many of 
them result from regulations, policies, or statutes.  Three of the four not-for-profit 
sector interviewees believed the FAR is beneficial, while the remaining one felt 
the FAR was a hurdle because it makes the procurement of knowledge-based 
services difficult.  The biggest constraint for any best practice is the human 
resource factor because contracting of any type of service requires continuous 
oversight.  After conducting the interviews and reading literature, our team 
developed a listing of possible USAF constraints of implementing the for-profit 
best practices identified from the interviews: 
1. Conducting Spend Analysis: Despite the USAF utilizing spend 
analysis to understand what it is spending its resources on and to 
determine inefficiencies, its focus is primarily on the broader level of 
spend data that focuses on contract redundancies for elimination or 
consolidation.  Although the USAF has achieved great success in 
many areas by using such broad data, it faces an uphill battle in 
conducting the type of in-depth spend analysis for sourcing 
knowledge-based services.  One constraint our research team as 
well as a knowledge-bases service team in the Enterprise Sourcing 
Group discovered is that the spend data available through EDA and 
FPDS–NG were either inaccurate, incomplete, or lacking the proper 
attachments.  In order to identify the deliverables for a knowledge-
based service contract, our team had to open every PWS/SOW of 
the selected 100 contracts to search for the actual deliverables.  
This was very time-consuming and often resulted in undefined 
deliverables within the PWS/SOW. The GAO (2012a) also reported 
that agencies are still challenged in obtaining and analyzing reliable 
and detailed agency-wide spend data.  Another constraint identified 
was the use of multiple CLINs within the same contract associated 
with various contract types like firm-fixed price (FFP), cost plus fixed 
fee (CPFF), and T&M, despite EDA and FPDS–NG displaying only 
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one contract type.  In order to fully understand and gain true benefits 
from the spend analysis, all contract types within a contract must be 
available for analysis through EDA and FPDS–NG.  The last 
constraint identified in fully implementing a thorough spend analysis 
down to the lowest level is the lack of personnel and time.  The 
USAF could overcome these constraints if it would update the 
contractual online platforms to accurately reflect all deliverables and 
contract types, which would reduce the amount of time and 
resources required to conduct a thorough spend analysis. 
2. Demand Management: The USAF can use demand management to 
look at the commodities and services it is consuming to determine 
what it can reduce, eliminate, or substitute, but the USAF needs 
spend data to fully realize savings.  Because demand management 
relies on spend data, the first constraint recognized for properly 
implementing demand management is the lack of reliable and 
detailed agency-wide spend data.  The second constraint for fully 
implementing demand management is the lack of training, 
experience, and workforce.  The last constraint is that it challenges 
an organization’s behavior and assumptions by restructuring how 
services are purchased, creating an environment where cost control 
becomes the responsibility of every employee (ATKearney, 2003).  
The USAF can overcome these constraints by fixing the E-Sourcing 
platforms to reflect accurate spend data.  Additionally, the leadership 
at every level must engage and support an atmosphere of cost 
control, let go of the perceptions that savings may cause budget 
decreases, and relinquish control of contracts that could be sourced 
at a DoD-wide level or reduced, substituted, or eliminated. 
3. Contract Consolidation: Although the USAF has been very 
successful with consolidating commodity contracts and some 
service contracts, it faces a challenge in consolidating knowledge-
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based service contracts.  The first constraint in fully implementing 
contract consolidation for knowledge-based services is the 
inadequate spend data without clearly defined deliverables and 
services.  The knowledge-based service council at Wright–Patterson 
Air Force Base found no economies of scale in terms of labor hours 
for knowledge-based services (Director of the USAF knowledge-
based services Council, personal communication, April 22, 2013).  
Additionally, knowledge-based services are hard to consolidated 
due to their various and dissimilar outcomes.  Another constraint for 
implementing contract consolidation in knowledge-based services is 
the socioeconomic set-aside goals that may minimize the amount of 
small contracts available to consolidate into one large contract.  
Additionally, many leaders do not like the idea of consolidating 
contracts with other internal and agency-wide departments for fear 
of losing control of their contractor, the ability to customize 
requirements, and reduction in future budget because of cost 
savings (GAO, 2012c).  The last constraint for implementing contract 
consolidation is the result of the fiscal law statutory requirements in 
terms of using the appropriated money for the time allotted, for the 
intended purpose, and for the amount given.  The USAF can 
overcome these constraints by updating their E-Sourcing platforms 
to reflect accurate and reliable data, as well as create a taxonomy of 
knowledge-based deliverables under each PSC that would allow for 
identifications of knowledge-based deliverables that could be 
consolidated.  Additionally, acquisition personnel need to conduct 
market research and involve the small businesses to determine how 
to consolidate contracts while maintaining the small business set-
aside goals.  Moreover, the leadership at every level must engage 
and support an atmosphere of cost control, let go of the perceptions 
that savings may cause budget decreases, relinquish control of 
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contracts that could be sourced at a DoD-wide level, and involve 
legal representation to determine how to consolidate contract 
involving possible fiscal issues regarding time, purpose, and 
amount. 
4. Use of Preferred Partners: Although the private sector has the 
freedom to choose vendors with little resistance, the USAF does not 
enjoy that freedom when sourcing knowledge-based services.  The 
CICA constrains the USAF from picking preferred vendors due to 
the mandatory use of full and open competition unless it meets one 
of the exemptions listed in FAR 6.  Additionally, the use of long-term 
contracts, if awarded to large organizations, could hurt the 
socioeconomic set-aside goals for small business utilization.  The 
USAF could overcome these constraints by considering the use of 
an award term incentive contract to develop the long-term partner 
without having to go through the competition process again.  
Additionally, acquisition personnel should conduct market research 
and involve small businesses when developing possible award term 
incentive contracts. 
5. Electronic Reverse Auctioning: Although there are no constraints for 
the USAF in utilizing eRAs, there is no potential cost savings benefit 
from using eRAs to source knowledge-based services with 
established labor rates.  The USAF could increase the potential for 
savings if it develops a taxonomy for knowledge-based services with 
defined deliverables.  Instead of using eRAs to source the 
knowledge-based service labor contracts, the USAF could source 
knowledge-based deliverables instead, allowing for potential cost 
savings.  eRAs can be used under simplified acquisition best value 
trade-off procedures or LPTA (Coyne, 2010). 
6. Cost Containment: Cost containment is similar to demand 
management, except cost containment seeks to reduce, substitute, 
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or eliminate redundancies within a program, project, or contract 
without eliminating the requirement.  The first constraint recognized 
for properly implementing cost containment is the lack of reliable 
and detailed spend data.  The second constraint for fully 
implementing cost containment is the lack of training, experience, 
and workforce.  The last constraint is that it challenges an 
organization’s behavior and assumptions by restructuring how 
services are purchased, creating an environment where cost control 
becomes the responsibility of every employee (ATKearney, 2003).  
The USAF can overcome these constraints by fixing the E-Sourcing 
platforms to reflect accurate spend data.  Additionally, the leadership 
at every level must engage and support an atmosphere of cost 
control, ensuring that employees are constantly looking for ways to 
save money without compromising effectiveness, as well as letting 
go of the perceptions that savings may cause budget decreases. 
7. E-Sourcing: There were no constraints identified for the USAF to 
fully implement the use of e-sourcing. 
RQ 4.  What are the different types of knowledge-based services being 
procured?  How much money is spent on these services, with how many different 
contractors, from how many different buying offices, and through how many 
different contract actions?  How many are with small businesses?  How many are 
sole source?  What is the composition by contract type? 
The USAF spend data for FY2010 (FPDS–NG, 2010) included 147,222 
contract actions with a total spend of $63.03 billion.  The USAF obligated $25.85 
billion out of $63.03 billion for the purpose of acquiring services, which was 
41.02% of the total USAF spend.  Out of 147,222 contract actions, 54,448 were 
initial awards, delivery orders and task orders, accounting for $22.13 billion, while 
92,774 contract actions were modifications to original contracts, accounting for 
an obligation of $40.90 billion. 
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Acquisition of knowledge-based services was a major part of the USAF 
spend.  The USAF is procuring knowledge-based services divided into the 
following seven categories (OUSD, 2010b): 
1. Engineering Management Services: Contractual services such as 
systems engineering, specifications development, technical 
assistance, engineering and technical services, simulations, and 
professional services and technology sharing. 
2. Program Management Services: Services related to RDT&E 
management and support, special studies and analysis, operations 
research, policy review and development, program evaluation, 
program management/support, program review/development, and 
management services/contract and procurement. 
3. Logistics Management Services: Support of logistics involves the 
integration of information, transportation, inventory, warehousing, 
material handling, and packaging, and occasionally security. 
4. Management Support Services: Contractual services that provide 
assistance or advice, for the efficient and effective management and 
operation your organization. 
5. Administrative and Other Services: Material management, courier 
and messenger support, transcription, mailing and distribution, 
library services, word processing and typing, stenography, and 
administrative technical support for conferences and training 
programs. 
6. Professional Services: Contracted services that provide organized, 
analytical evaluations in support of policy review and development, 
program management support, operations research, simulation 
services, specifications development, systems engineering, 
analyses, or evaluations. 
7. Education and Training: Contracted services that provide education 
and training assistance (DAU, n.d.-b.). 
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There are a total 218 PSCs in the category of knowledge-based services 
in the PSC manual that are divided into the above seven categories (OUSD, 
2010b).  However, in FY2010, the USAF procured services from 126 PSCs within 
knowledge-based services.  There was no expenditure on the remaining 92 
PSCs during FY2010.  Knowledge-based services accounted for $9.77 billion, 
which was 15.5% of the total spend and 37.82% of spend on services.  Out of the 
total spend of $9.77 billion on knowledge-based services, $3.59 billion were 
obligated on initial awards, delivery orders and task orders, whereas remaining 
$6.18 billion were obligated towards modifications. 
In FY2010, 3,292 contractors were involved in the provision of knowledge-
based services to the USAF.  Out of these 3,292 contractors, 5.83% of the 
contractors received 59.64% of the total contract actions for knowledge-based 
services.  However, the other 94.17% of the contractors accounted for rest of the 
contract actions with an average of 3.55 contracts per contractor. 
Out of the total 245 different buying offices that undertook contracts with 
the USAF in FY2010, 209 buying offices were involved in the acquisition of 
knowledge-based services.  The acquisition workforce shrunk by 3,370 
personnel during 2001 to 2008 (GAO, 2009a), however obligations for 
knowledge-based services in DoD increased from $28.3 billion to $45.2 billion 
between FY2005 and FY2011 (DPAP, 2012; GAO, 2007a).  Fragmented buying 
involving more than 80% of the buying offices in the acquisition of knowledge-
based services may prevent the USAF from capturing tacit knowledge.  When we 
compare this with for-profit sector interview’s data, we found that all four 
organizations operating from multiple locations are using centralized buying 
offices.  This tacit knowledge not only will help to achieve efficiencies while 
contracting in the future, but will also help to understand the deliverables and 
administering the contracts more efficiently. 
Socioeconomic development and providing an opportunity to small 
businesses in contracting is mandated by the government (FAR, 2013c).  In 
FY2010, the DoD set a goal of 22.28% of the obligated dollars for small business 
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set-aside and achieved 20.94%.  The USAF fell short of the DoD’s goal and 
achievement with only 14.4% of the obligated dollars going to small businesses 
(U.S. Air Force, 2011).  The set-aside requirement highlights the additional legal 
mandates such as the ‘Rule of Two’ faced by government buying offices to meet 
the socioeconomic programs (SBA, 2012).  As per the interview data, none of the 
for-profit sector buying offices faced this constraint in implementing the best 
practices for cost savings.  However, for the USAF, consolidation of contracts, 
that were set-aside for small business, may result in bundling which could lead to 
additional requirements (FAR, 2012b).  Bundling refers to the consolidation of 
two or more requirements previously performed under separate smaller contracts 
that is likely to preclude a contract being awarded to small business (FAR, 
2013b).  Cost savings through bundling could affect the government’s goal for 
small business set-aside.  Therefore it is becoming difficult for the USAF to 
balance between contract consolidation and meeting its socioeconomic 
requirements. 
In our five selected PSCs, 748 (34.62%) original contracts out of 2,160 
were sole source arrangements.  Table 9 depicts the breakdown of single and 
sole source contracts in the selected five categories.  Two hundred and fifty 
contracts were not available for competition, and 498 contracts were not 
competed.  Sole-source arrangements in 23% of the USAF knowledge-based 
contracts present an opportunity for supplier development and cost savings by 
taking extraordinary measures to infuse competition. 
Finally, we found that the USAF used a number of contract types while 
procuring knowledge-based services.  When we analyzed 2,160 original 
contracts in the selected five PSCs by contract type, we found that there were 
987 fixed-price contracts, 868 cost-reimbursement types, 275 T&M contracts, 
and the remaining 30 were LH contracts.  Our analysis of the for-profit sector 
interviews also reflected that four out of seven respondents preferred the use of 
fixed-price contracts where the performance risk lay more with the contractor.  
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Using performance-based contracts in place of T&M and LH contracts presents a 
significant opportunity for savings. 
RQ 5.  What are the different outcomes/deliverables of contracted 
knowledge-based services (e.g., technical reports, research, staff support labor, 
education, training, analysis, advice, briefings, white papers)? 
To analyze the outcomes/deliverables of contracted knowledge-based 
services, we took a sample of 100 contracts from the five selected categories of 
knowledge-based services.  The selected 100 contracts displayed a huge variety 
of deliverables.  Each contract provided different types of deliverables.  Important 
deliverables with respect to the selected 100 contracts are as follows: 
1. To render technical support services including studies, analyses, 
and evaluation of engineering/technical issues, ground and flight-
test data packages, in-plant technical support, weapon system 
engineering and technical support, and undertaking system 
engineering and integration, etc. 
2. To provide advisory services such as hardware/software solutions, 
qualification testing of software, investigation and resolution of 
anomalies, arrangement of guidance conferences for engineering 
data, and qualified and experienced technical advisors, etc. 
3. To develop and provide a variety of plans, including program 
management plans, system engineering management plans, 
logistics support plans, quality control plans, configuration 
management plans, integrated master plans, systems engineering 
management plans, test and evaluation program plan, risk 
management plans, supply support plans, software development 
plans, etc. 
4. To prepare and furnish reports, papers, and documents, such as 
life-cycle management documents, technical reports, updates to 
technical orders, status reports, presentations, briefings, information 
papers, graphics, analyses, and other documentation. 
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5. To provide program management/contract support services, such as 
preparation of acquisition strategy and assistance in source 
selection. 
6. To assist and provide IT-related services, such as data rights, files in 
an appropriate format, delivery and testing of software solutions, etc. 
7. To supply logistics support services, such as fuels management, 
cargo movement, cargo movement travel and training, 
communication, medical, etc. 
RQs 6 & 7.  Of the different outcomes of knowledge-based services, what 
are the major cost drivers (e.g., time, labor rates, skills, travel, etc.) of each by 
type?  How are costs minimized?  Can those cost drivers be better managed to 
increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness?  If so, how? 
To identify cost drivers, we undertook a three-prong approach, starting 
with the literature review, followed by a quantitative analysis, and finishing with 
the qualitative analysis.  From the interviews, we were able to identify some 
outcomes, cost drivers, and cost minimization techniques.  Table 16 depicts the 
important cost drivers as identified by the for-profit sector interviewees. 
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Table 16.   Interview Outcomes, Cost Drivers, and Cost Minimizers 
 
  
The USAF FY2010 spend data and the content analysis of the selected 
100 contracts highlights travel, security clearances, software data rights, and the 
construction of a test facility as some of the cost drivers.  Additionally, for-profit 
and not-for-profit data analysis revealed skill level and labor hours/rates as major 
cost drivers.  To minimize travel costs, the USAF should use demand 
management to determine whether travel is necessary or can be substituted by 
Private Sector Interviewee Outcome Cost Driver Minimization
Assisted Living Services Company
Sales enhancement, 
Resident satisfaction
Legal fee variation by 
location
Apply TCO 
Domestic and International Relocation Company Serviceable actions Labor hours Competitive bidding
Petroleum Management Company
Piping & Instrumentation 
Diagram, Alignment 
Sheets for pipelines
Labor hours Competitive bidding
Food Production and Distribution Company
Technical report, research, 
staff support labor, 
education, training, 
analysis, expertise, advice, 
presentations, white paper
Labor hours driven by 
expertise level of 
personnel
Well defined requirement 
in SOW outlining 
deliverables, require 
detailed bids, metrics to 
ensure you are getting 
what you ask for
Global Engineering Company
Scope defined in the 
contract
Level of complexity
Competitive bidding, Well 
defined SOW, Distinction




Travel, Keeping training 
materials up-to-date
Forecasting and managing 
personnel and training 
material
Global Payment Processing Company
Technical reports, 
research, staff support, 
education, training, 
analysis, expertise, advice, 
presentation, white paper
Labor rates, Lead-time, 
Timing, Competition
Proper planning, Accurate 






research, staff support, 
education, training, 
analysis, expertise, advice, 
presentation, white paper
Time, Need, Duration, 
Risk, Urgency, Complexity, 
Criticality




research, staff support, 
education, training, 
analysis, expertise, advice, 
presentation, white paper
Labor hours, Labor rates, 
Position descriptions of 
personnel
Accurately describe needs, 
Competitive bidding, 
Sound analysis of 
proposals
Department of the Army # 1
Technical reports, 
research, staff support, 
education, training, 
analysis, expertise, advice, 
presentation, white paper
Unable to identify due to 
lack of personnel and 
expertise
Proper Lead-time allows 
for defined requirement, 
Competitive Bidding
Department of the Army # 2
Technical reports, 
research, staff support, 
education, training, 
analysis, expertise, advice, 
presentation, white paper, 






another means of communication.  To minimize the security clearance costs, the 
USAF should ensure that only personnel that need to have clearances obtain 
them.  Although data rights have large upfront costs, it is important for the USAF 
to decide early in the development phase whether it requires the data rights from 
the supplier.  This will eliminate potential future costs associated by not owning 
the data rights and can allow for competitive bidding in future contracts often 
resulting in lower costs.  Although there was only one instance of facility 
construction out of the 100 contracts analyzed, it is important for the USAF to 
determine alternate solutions/existing locations instead of constructing a new 
facility.  The best way to minimize costs for skill level, labor rates, and labor 
hours is for the USAF to conduct demand management, ensure the requirement 
is well defined, and conduct market research.   
Based on the analysis of interviews and spend data, our team identified 
six major cost drivers.  Details that include ways to minimize the cost drivers and 
increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness are enumerated in the 
following paragraphs: 
1.  Lack of Standardized Taxonomy for the Deliverables: The content 
analysis of our selected 100 contracts revealed a variety of 
deliverables for knowledge-based services.  At present, there is no 
standard taxonomy for the categorization of these deliverables.  
During the content analysis, we observed that the absence of the 
categorization of deliverables had a negative impact on the quality of 
the PWS.  It is essential to have clarity of thought for the 
development of a comprehensive PWS.  In the absence of a 
standard taxonomy of deliverables, the user and the contracting 
officer may find it difficult to develop a good PWS.  Non-availability 
of clear deliverables especially in cost reimbursement, T&M, and LH 
type of contracts, can result in major cost overruns.  For example, in 
most of the knowledge-based advisory and assistance service 
contracts from our selected PSCs, we found that the contract 
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required a person to be physically present at the site.  Whereas, in 
contract number FA920007D0045, we found that the advisory and 
assistance service was contracted in two parts; limited physical on-
site support as well as support provided via e-mail / phone.  
Additionally, in contract number FA820706D0001, we found that the 
advisory and assistance services were conducted via e-mail / 
phone.  Since our research identified labor hours as a major cost 
driver in the acquisition of knowledge-based services, it is imperative 
to identify the exact deliverable that is contracted so as to minimize 
the labor hours.  In order to mitigate the effect of this cost driver, the 
DoD needs to develop a taxonomy for the deliverables in order to 
bring clarity and standardization.  Our proposed taxonomy (Table 
11) divides the deliverables between tangible and intangible 
services which helps to determine the extent of customer interaction 
in service production.  A standard taxonomy could save money by 
allowing the USAF to contract for deliverables, thereby reducing 
labor hours and travel costs.  Additional cost savings can be reaped 
by contracting in a region where labor costs are cheaper. 
2. Ineffective Demand management: For-profit sector interviews 
identified demand management as one of the best practices for cost 
savings.  The USAF needs to look at the commodities and services 
they are consuming to determine what they can reduce, eliminate, or 
substitute.  To achieve this, the USAF needs to change the culture 
regarding how it views demand management throughout the 
organization.  The leadership at every level must engage and 
support an atmosphere of cost control, let go of the perceptions that 
savings may cause budget decreases, and relinquish control of 
contracts that could be sourced at a DoD-wide level, reduced, 
substituted, or eliminated.  For example, in the USAF knowledge-
based service spend, the Director of the USAF knowledge-based 
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services Council said, “In some areas, 97% of the money is spent at 
the end of the fiscal year” (personal communication, April, 22, 2013).  
This raises a question for the legitimacy of the demand.  
Additionally, we identified travel cost as one of the cost drivers in 
quantitative analysis.  To minimize the travel costs, the USAF should 
use demand management to determine whether travel is necessary 
or can be substituted by another means of communication.   
3. Excessive Cost of Outsourcing: Another way to achieve efficiencies 
is by looking at the benefits of either insourcing or outsourcing.  
POGO conducted a cost benefit analysis in 2011 between federal 
and contract employees in over 35 employment categories and 
concluded that a contract employee earns 1.83 times more in total 
compensation as opposed to a federal employee in 33 of the 35 
categories (2013).  Table 14 depicts knowledge-based services that 
POGO analyzed that were closely associated with the five PSCs we 
analyzed in this research.  Out of these knowledge-based services, 
a contractor earns on average 1.76 times more than a federal 
employee (POGO, 2013).  The USAF should compare the price of a 
federal employee vis-à-vis the cost of outsourcing and managing 
that employee because the federal employee can often be more 
flexible and require less oversight even if the cost of outsourcing 
may cost less.  The efficient use of a make or buy decision in 
conjunction with a spend analysis can bring efficiency in the USAF 
strategic sourcing. 
4. Non-Consolidation of Contracts: The for-profit sector identified 
consolidation of the contracts as one of the best practices.  Most of 
the for-profit sector organizations, operating at multiple locations, 
aim to have a centralized procurement office.  The center-led 
procurement office allows the management of the for-profit sector 
organization to better control manpower and effectively assign a 
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contract to the most qualified individual.  Although the USAF has 
some constraints in consolidating knowledge-based service 
contracts, there are opportunities for the USAF to realize additional 
cost savings.  The content analysis of our selected 100 knowledge-
based service contracts revealed that the USAF is acquiring similar 
knowledge-based services from different buying offices.  By 
consolidating the acquisition of knowledge-based services of 
geographically dispersed buying offices, the USAF can achieve 
transactional cost savings.  Additionally, consolidating these service 
contracts to a region where labor rates are cheaper and the 
deliverable does not require physical presence of labor may result in 
additional savings.  Contract consolidation can also help decrease 
the effects of a shortage in the acquisition workforce by eliminating 
contract staff redundancies in contract management. 
5. Lack of Supplier Development for Knowledge-Based Services: The 
content analysis of the 2160 knowledge-based service contracts in 
the selected five categories revealed that 498 contracts were “not 
competed.”  We identified lack of competition in 23.05% (498) 
contracts as one of the major cost drivers for knowledge-based 
services which highlights a possible opportunity for supplier 
development and cost savings.  The United States Navy used the 
supplier development concept in the case of its Littoral Combat Ship 
to develop an additional supplier to increase competition and drive 
down costs (CRS, 2010).  Some of the contracts involving software 
stay in the category of “not available for competition” due to non-
availability of unlimited data rights with the government.  The USAF 
should consider purchasing software data rights at the onset of the 
contract to decrease sole-source scenarios and allow for competitive 
bidding.  Once the USAF awards a sole source contract, there is a 
good chance that all follow-on contracts will also be sole sourced to 
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the same firm without being competed.  In order to alleviate the 
effect of limited supplier base on these specific knowledge-based 
services, the USAF needs to conduct a thorough spend 
analysis/market research and target potential sources for supplier 
development of such sole-sourced contracts. 
6. Lack of Knowledge Management System: The combination of the 
spend data and content analysis of the selected 100 contracts 
revealed that a number of knowledge-based services were 
outsourced.  Repeated outsourcing of the knowledge-based 
services by the USAF allows the contractors to reap the benefits 
achieved through the accumulation of tacit knowledge and learning 
curves.  We identified the lack of an overarching knowledge 
management system in the USAF to retain tacit knowledge as one 
of the cost drivers.  The USAF should attempt to capture its tacit 
knowledge by using a technique similar to the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned that continually conducts interviews, records real-
time videos, processes real-time images, and transforms them into 
useful knowledge broadcasted for use by all personnel.  Using an 
external source like CALL would allow the USAF to develop a 
continuously updated system and document its tacit knowledge 
without effecting day-to-day operations.  Additionally, the system 
could act as a venue for posting previously purchased deliverables 
(reports, analyses, research, etc.) so that buyers do not buy the 
same thing twice simply due to ignorance of other contracts.  A 
recent article suggests that sharing data, such as analysis, opens up 
information to some people who would not normally have access 
and allows others to maintain a better work-life balance by allowing 
remote access (Marks, 2013). 
7. Lack of Quality Spend Data: Most of the for-profit sector 
interviewees rely on spend analysis to efficiently undertake strategic 
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sourcing.  Decisions based on accurate figures affect the overall 
performance of an organization. Non-availability of a good quality 
spend data can adversely affect the outcome of the spend analysis.  
The quantitative analysis of the USAF spend data for FY2010 
revealed that presently FPDS–NG records all obligations in a 
contract under a single PSC; however, most of the contracts have 
more than one CLIN, and often these CLINs belong to different 
PSCs.  Moreover, the availability of a PSC under the “others” 
heading, within each category of the PSC manual, also affects the 
proper recording of spend data.  Erroneous data provides the 
misrepresentation of the actual spend and may lead the decision-
makers to arrive at a wrong conclusion.  Because strategic sourcing 
starts and ends with spend analysis, inadequate spend data inhibits 
the effective use of the for-profit sector best practices and 
considered as a cost driver.  By adopting a system that presents 
accurate data, the USAF will be able to exploit the spend analysis to 
its full potential in its strategic sourcing. 
Cost drivers can be better managed to increase efficiency without 
compromising effectiveness by standardizing a taxonomy for the deliverables, 
managing demand, consolidating contracts, developing suppliers, implementing 
an overarching knowledge management system, and ensuring quality spend 
data. 
RQ 8.  By applying commercial best practices and original ideas, how 
much cost could be saved or avoided? 
Although the scope of this study did not cover the cost-benefit analysis in 
terms of dollars saved, the USAF can achieve cost savings/avoidance through 
standardizing taxonomy for the deliverables, managing demand, consolidating 
contracts, and developing suppliers; and by implementing an overarching 
knowledge management system and ensuring quality spend data.  ATKearny 
(2003) stated that “savings in excess of 10 percent of analyzed spend are not 
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uncommon.”  This 10% savings results from analyzing the spend data and 
applying demand management levers such as eliminating demand, reducing 
quantity, simplifying specifications, reducing frequency, encouraging substitution, 
imposing tighter process and tracking, increasing cost awareness, and tightening 
policies (ATKearny, 2003).  Additionally, market research, reverse auctioning, 
and e-sourcing all promote competitive bidding, which can often produce cost 
savings.  In 2008, the USAF realized a $395,000 savings by utilizing reverse 
auctioning to purchase and install 29 backup generators (McCree, 2008).  Use of 
preferred vendors in long-term contracts can often reduce costs by spreading the 
overhead costs over multiple years and often providing volume rebates to the 
customer.  The Navy is currently developing a Superior Supplier Incentive 
Program (SSIP) for the DoD, with the intent to recognize contractors by granting 
them Superior Supplier Status (SSS), using baseline data from Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) (Kendall, 2013).  The 
suppliers can achieve SSS status by focusing on cost, schedule, performance, 
quality, and business relations and could receive more favorable contract terms 
and conditions in contracts (Kendall, 2013). 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we conducted a quantitative analysis of the FY2010 USAF 
spend data and a qualitative analysis of 11 interviews conducted with the for-
profit and not-for-profit sectors.  Our analysis, along with our literature review, 
provided the information needed to answer our research questions.  In the next 
chapter, we provide discussions and implications, offer recommendations for the 
USAF, study the limitations, and suggest areas for further research. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Obligations on the acquisition of services have doubled between FY2001 
and FY2008, from $92 billion to $200 billion (GAO, 2009b).  Knowledge-based 
services constitute an increasing portion of the total services acquired by the 
DoD.  Between FY2005 and FY2011, the DoD increased the use of knowledge-
based services from $28.3 billion to $45.2 billion (DPAP, 2012; GAO, 2007a).  
However, the DoD is currently unable to determine how much savings can be 
attained in this area by using the for-profit sector best practices for acquiring 
such services.  The purpose of this research was to explore whether and how the 
USAF can improve efficiency in sourcing knowledge-based services by instituting 
commercial best practices in strategic sourcing.  The research tried to bridge a 
literature gap, identify best practices, and apply them in the context of the USAF.  
During the research, our team sought to address the following eight research 
questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the relevant tenets of strategic 
sourcing? 
Research Question 2: What are commercial best practices in 
sourcing knowledge-based services? 
Research Question 3: What are the constraints, if any, of applying 
the commercial best practices in the USAF context? 
Research Question 4: What are the different types of knowledge-
based services being procured?   How much money is spent on 
these services, with how many different contractors, from how 
many different buying offices, and through how many different 
contract actions?  How many are with small businesses?  How 
many are sole source?  What is the composition by contract type? 
Research Question 5: What are the different outcomes/deliverables 
of contracted knowledge-based services (e.g., technical reports, 
research, staff support labor, education, training, analysis, advice, 
briefings, white papers)? 
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Research Question 6: Of the different outcomes of knowledge-
based services, what are the major cost drivers (e.g., time, labor 
rates, skills, travel) of each by type?  How are costs minimized? 
Research Question 7: Can those cost drivers be better managed to 
increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness?  If so, 
how? 
Research Question 8: By applying commercial best practices and 
original ideas, how much cost could be saved or avoided? 
These questions were addressed using a three-pronged approach (i.e., a 
study of already available literature on the subject, a spend analysis of USAF 
FY2010 data, and undertaking interviews from both for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors).  We were able to identify the relevant tenets of strategic sourcing and 
commercial best practices in sourcing knowledge-based services through 
literature review and qualitative interviews.  Moreover, to study the modalities of 
applying these best practices on the USAF, we were able to extract the relevant 
records from FPDS–NG FY2010 spend data and undertook detailed analysis of 
100 knowledge-based FY2010 USAF sample contracts.  The comparison of the 
for-profit sector best practices and extracts from the USAF spend data helped us 
to identify the cost drivers and the theoretical options to manage these cost 
drivers. 
B. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In order to implement best practices for use by the USAF and to eliminate 
inefficiencies and redundancies in the acquisition of knowledge-based services, 
we analyzed the differences in the environments in which the USAF and the for-
profit sector operate.  There are certain limitations within the USAF that act as 
barriers in the complete implementation of the commercial best practices in its 
contracting operations.  Before implementing any set of best practices in the 
sourcing of the USAF knowledge-based services contracting, it is prudent to 
discuss implications of the commercial sector best practices in light of these 
barriers. 
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1. Security Implications: The for-profit sector organizations primarily 
focus on increasing their revenues and return on investments by 
applying best practices such as strategic sourcing, leveraging of 
global suppliers, and internal resources and processes. Although the 
USAF can also achieve cost savings by applying some best 
practices, there are certain issues relating to security which prevent 
the USAF from adopting these measures. Legal mandates, such as 
The Buy American Act/Berry Amendment and issues relating to 
security clearances are a few barriers that impede the USAF in 
implementing global sourcing to its true potential.  
2. Organizational Size and Diversity: The USAF is much larger 
organization when compared with the for-profit sector organizations 
with respect to geographical diversity and the amount of dollars it 
spends annually.  The for-profit sector organizations use demand 
management to look at the commodities and services they are 
consuming to determine what they can reduce, eliminate, or 
substitute.  Although the USAF uses demand management to 
realize cost savings in some areas, its size, geographic dispersion, 
lack of leadership involvement, organizational culture, decentralized 
organization structure, lack of goals, measurement, and 
accountability for cost performance outside of weapon systems 
make it difficult to implement demand management to its full 
potential. 
3. Shortage in Acquisition Workforce: Over the last decade, the DoD 
and USAF have increased the use of knowledge-based service 
contracts while facing a shortage in the acquisition workforce to 
manage the increasing workload efficiently.  Although the USAF is 
saving money and filling the present capability gaps by outsourcing 
knowledge-based services, it is finding it difficult to capture the 
valuable tacit knowledge.  A future shortage of knowledge workers 
 126 
could cause the USAF to spend even more money on outsourcing 
knowledge-based services or retaining current knowledge workers.  
The present hiring freeze due to sequestration can further aggravate 
this problem.  If the present scenario persists, the USAF may find it 
even more difficult to retain the tacit knowledge and may struggle to 
perform on par with its for-profit sector counterparts.  The shortage 
of workforce, increased workload, huge amount of transactions 
made annually, and non-availability of an accountability tool use to 
penalize individuals for inadvertently spoiling FPDS–NG data affects 
the quality of spend data.  Spend analysis is the cornerstone of 
strategic sourcing, and the non-availability of reliable spend data can 
handicap the USAF in implementing this best practice. 
4. Legal Mandates: The for-profit sector utilizes preferred partners 
when they contract for services.  These long-term relationships with 
qualified vendors help them in achieving substantial cost savings.  
Owing to the legal requirements, such as the FAR and CICA, the 
USAF is to promote full and open competition, which can sometime 
handicap the development of strategic partnerships with suppliers.  
Similarly, the requirement of other legal mandates such as the Buy 
American Act/Berry Amendment may prevent the USAF from global 
partnerships, which is against the norms of the for-profit sector 
organizations. 
5. Socioeconomic Programs: The data gathered through interviews 
showed that the for-profit sector companies did not face any 
handicap in implementing the best practices to achieve its goals of 
cost savings.  However, the USAF, being a government not-for-profit 
organization, is bound to fulfill certain legal mandates, such as the 
‘Rule of Two’, to meet the socioeconomic programs (SBA, 2012).  
Contract consolidation is one of the best practices from the for-profit 
sector, but socioeconomic set-asides and legal mandates are 
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common barriers for the USAF in implementing contract 
consolidation.  The USAF is using contract consolidation to eliminate 
redundancies caused by multiple contracts for the same item and 
achieves cost efficiencies by using contract instruments such as 
BPAs and IDIQ contracts.  There is an opportunity for the USAF to 
consolidate its contracts and avoid additional administrative and 
transactional costs.  Consolidation of contracts can also help in cost 
savings through better prices and geographical relocations.  The 
government cannot deny the importance of using socioeconomic 
programs and legal mandates; however, they do hinder the 
implementation of the best practices in their true spirit.  
6. Lack of Common Goals and Tangible Measures of Performance: 
The major goal of for-profit sector organizations is to enhance value 
for their shareholders by increasing revenues, return on 
investments, and return on assets.  Members of a for-profit sector 
organization focus on achieving this goal, and management uses 
tangible measures to assess the performance of each individual.  
However, in the USAF, there is sometimes a slight contrast in the 
objectives of stakeholders, and there is no tangible measure to 
gauge their inefficiencies.  For instance, the requirement 
community’s objectives are at times different from those of the 
acquisitions workforce.  The difference in objectives affects the 
overall goal of the organization.  The effects of these irregularities 
varies from cost inefficiencies to imprecise PWSs/SOWs. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation 1: The DoD needs to develop a standard taxonomy for 
the deliverables to effectively mention in the requirements documents. 
The OUSD (2010b) memorandum Taxonomy for the Acquisition of 
Services clearly identifies all the services under 33 portfolios (in six portfolio 
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groups).  Before the issuance of this memorandum in 2010, there was no 
standard taxonomy for the different types of services.  The introduction of this 
memorandum brought significant standardization among different groups of 
services.  However, currently there is no standard taxonomy for the deliverables 
contracted under the different portfolio groups or PSCs.  There is a huge variety 
of deliverables contracted when acquiring services, especially for the knowledge-
based services.  For the development of a PWS, clarity of thought is essential.  In 
the absence of a standard taxonomy of deliverables, the user and the contracting 
officer may find it difficult to develop a good PWS.  The DoD needs to develop a 
taxonomy for the deliverables in order to bring clarity and standardization.  
Moreover, the development of taxonomy will also give an opportunity for cost 
savings by purchasing deliverables of knowledge-based services instead of labor 
hours for undefined requirements.  Table 11 depicts a proposed taxonomy that 
breaks down a sample of deliverables between intangible and tangible services 
applied to personnel or possessions. 
Recommendation 2: The USAF should attempt to develop expertise by 
consolidating its contracts across different buying offices 
The for-profit sector identified consolidation of the contracts as one of the 
best practices.  Most of the for-profit sector organizations, operating at multiple 
locations, aim to have a centralized contracting office.  This allows the for-profit 
sector organizations to keep their contracting manpower at one location and 
assign a contract to the most qualified individual.  However, the scenario is quite 
different for the USAF due to a number of factors, such as the huge amount of 
contracting involved, socioeconomic set-aside contracts, customers wanting to 
retain control over their contracts, dissimilar services, fiscal law (time, purpose, 
amount), and oversight.  Despite these constraints, there is a huge opportunity 
for the USAF to consolidate its requirements geographically or by type of service 
contracted.  Apart from transactional cost savings, consolidation of two 
knowledge-based contracts to a single geographical location, where the cost of 
labor is comparatively less, could result in substantial savings. 
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Recommendation 3: The USAF needs to broaden the scope of demand 
management in conjunction with their spend analysis. 
Although a spend analysis can reduce costs immediately by consolidating 
contracts and eliminating redundancies, demand management goes one step 
further and looks at the consumption.  The USAF needs to look at the services it 
is consuming to determine what it can reduce, eliminate, or substitute.  To 
achieve this, the USAF needs to change the culture about how it views demand 
management throughout the organization.  Leadership is the most important 
aspect for success of any kind of change effort.  The leadership at every level 
must engage and support an atmosphere of cost control, let go of the 
perceptions that savings may cause budget decreases, and relinquish control of 
contracts that could be sourced at a DoD-wide level, reduced, substituted, or 
eliminated.  Another way to achieve efficiencies through demand management is 
by looking at the benefits of either insourcing or outsourcing.  The efficient use of 
demand management at every level in conjunction with spend analysis can bring 
efficiency in the USAF sourcing. 
Recommendation 4: The USAF should look into the possibilities of 
supplier development for “not competed” contracts to ensure that follow-on 
knowledge-based services support can be competed. 
Out of the 748 sole-sourced contracts, 250 contracts were not available 
for competition.  Once the USAF awards a contract as sole source, it is likely that 
all follow-on contracts will also go to the same firm without being competed.  This 
presents a possible opportunity for supplier development, which will result in 
competition, and cost savings for all the follow-on contracts.  The USAF needs to 
include a means of evaluating the other offeror’s ability to perform a contract and 
the possibility of supplier development for “not available for competition” 
contracts to ensure that follow-on knowledge-based services support can be 
competed. 
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Recommendation 5: The USAF should look into the possibility of making 
CORs a permanent position instead of a secondary job. 
Presenting clearly defined performance metrics up front to a supplier can 
reduce the risk of substandard performance.  The USAF already uses metrics 
such as performance evaluations and quality assurance surveillance plans to 
track knowledge-based services that are monitored by CORs; however, lack of 
training, time, technical expertise, and oversight often allows contractors to 
complete substandard services.  The USAF should consider making CORs a 
permanent position instead of a secondary job so that they can dedicate their 
efforts solely to conducting evaluations and providing feedback to the contractor 
in order to eliminate the waste of resources due to incomplete or substandard 
work.  Although these permanent COR positions may increase personnel costs, 
properly implemented performance metrics can lead to increased efficiencies 
while maintaining effectiveness. 
Recommendation 6: The USAF should look into the possibilities of 
retaining tacit knowledge. 
The analysis of knowledge-based services revealed that a number of 
services have been outsourced and are being procured repeatedly by the USAF.  
In this manner, the USAF is spending money on the same service continuously.  
No organic capability has been prepared or retained in this regard, which creates 
multiple issues.  First, when the USAF outsources the service, the contractor 
reaps the benefits through learning curves and retention of tacit knowledge.  
Second, the USAF is unable to define its requirements correctly and may no 
longer have the organic capability to check the quality of the service.  The USAF 
should attempt to capture its tacit knowledge by using a technique similar to the 
CALL that continually conducts interviews, records real-time videos, processes 
real-time images, and transforms them into useful knowledge broadcasted for 
use by all personnel. 
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Recommendation 7: The DoD should record every CLIN in FPDS–NG by 
its individual PSC. 
Presently, FPDS–NG records all obligations in a contract under a single 
PSC; however, most of the contracts have more than one CLIN, and often these 
CLINs belong to different PSCs.  The for-profit sector highlights spend analysis as 
one of the best practices to achieve efficiency.  The same practice is also being 
done in all components of the DoD; however, once a PSC is selected for the 
purpose of spend analysis, it provides a misleading number in most of cases.  This 
is due to the presence of different CLINs under a single contract PSC.  To 
undertake the spend analysis efficiently; all obligations need to be recorded under 
their respective PSCs.  However, if the government lacks the funds to upgrade the 
FPDS-NG, the next best alternative would be to add fields in the existing contract 
action report.  This will allow the contracting officer to break down the obligation of 
a contract and precisely report the spend on a particular PSC. 
Recommendation 8: The DoD should add a field for the type of 
deliverable in the FPDS–NG data. 
Presently, there is no taxonomy for the contracted deliverables and hence 
the FPDS–NG record does not depict the nature of service contracted.  The DoD 
needs to develop and implement a taxonomy for the deliverables and 
subsequently add an additional column in the FPDS-NG program for recording 
deliverables and undertaking spend analysis.  For example, Table 17 suggests a 
codification of the deliverables for entering data as per our suggested model in 
Table 11. 
Table 17.   Suggested Codification for the Deliverables 
Type of Deliverable Suggested Codes for FPDS-NG 
People Processing 1 
Possession Processing 2 
Mental Stimulus Processing 3 
Information Processing 4 
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Recommendation 9: The DoD should eliminate the “other” services and 
product PSC category from the PSC manual. 
In order to have a clear visibility of the obligations by PSC, it is essential to 
record data properly.  Availability of a PSC under the “others” heading within 
each category of the PSC manual is a wrong but convenient way to record an 
obligation.  Elimination of the “other” PSC headings will leave the data recorders 
with no option but to find an exact PSC to which the obligations belong. 
D. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
A number of limitations and areas restricted the in-depth analysis of this 
study.  These limitations included a lack of clarity in the data, limited responses 
to interviews solicited, and administrative issues.  We enumerated some of the 
pertinent limitations that affected the outcome of this study below: 
1. In our research, we used a small sample from a large population.  
We handled 100 contracts for an in-depth analysis of cost drivers 
and deliverables as compared to 6,677 original contracts in the 
category of knowledge-based services.  Additionally, we used a 
convenience sample rather than using a random sample.  We 
selected 20 contracts in each of the five selected categories 
depending on the maximum amount of spend.  Such a sample is 
bound to produce some biases, and this presented some figures 
that may not convey the actual meanings. 
2. This research was based on the spend data provided by FPDS–NG 
(2010).  A careful analysis of the data presented a number of 
shortcomings.  For example, due to ambiguity in the PSC manual, a 
number of contracts were placed in the “others” category, which 
equates to miscellaneous expenditure and does not present the 
exact expenditure in a given category.  Another shortcoming was the 
presence of a number of CLINs in a single contract.  Most of the 
CLINs belonged to a different PSC; however, the FPDS–NG data 
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accounts for them under a single PSC with the maximum amount of 
spend.  In addition, some of the contracts were recorded under the 
wrong PSC, and without opening the contract or SOW, the exact 
purpose of the spend could not be determined.  Hence, the spend 
analysis conducted with this sort of data contains some inherent 
flaws. 
3. We developed a comprehensive research questionnaire for each of 
the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors.  It was a cumbersome job to 
identify the for-profit sector interviewee, who was involved in the 
acquisition of services, representing one of the selected five PSCs.  
We believe some respondents avoided the interview due to a 
lengthy questionnaire.  Although we were able to get an 11% 
response rate, it was far less than expected.  In addition, few of the 
questions were aimed at the organizational structure or the financial 
status of the firm; in such cases, the respondents were reluctant to 
tell the exact figures regarding sensitive or vulnerable areas.  In 
addition, some of the questions were perception based, and it was 
the self-reported perceptions of the contracting individuals, which 
introduces bias. 
4. Our analysis was based on the USAF spend for FY2010.  Despite a 
number of attempts, we were unable to interview a single USAF 
contracting employee who was involved in the acquisition of 
knowledge-based services.  Although we were able to contact two 
individuals who worked in the contracting field, they were unable to 
provide specific insight to the research questions. 
5. Our team lost months waiting for the IRB approval due to 
administrative issues at NPS, which limited our time to conduct 
interviews and further analysis. 
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study focused primarily on the effectiveness gained through 
implementing commercial sector best practices in the acquisition of knowledge-
based services.  However, during the course of the study, we realized a number 
of places where the USAF may achieve savings.   
1. We realized that the USAF has multiple buying offices at the same 
location, and at times all contracting for the same type of service.  
Contract consolidation came out to be one of the for-profit sector 
best practices.  This best practice could eliminate redundancies and 
develop expertise in the acquisition workforce.  Although the USAF 
does not presently account for administrative or transactional costs, 
a study to find the transactional cost savings involved in 
consolidation of the contracts should be undertaken in future.  
Transaction costs in the government are likely to be substantial; 
thus, mitigating them could reduce total costs of ownership. 
2. The presence of a standard taxonomy has the ability to streamline a 
complicated system.  The OUSD (2010b) memorandum Taxonomy 
for the Acquisition of Services, identified all the services in six 
categories as per the PSC.  However, there is no taxonomy on the 
deliverables while acquiring services which impacts the clear and 
precise analysis of the true outcome being purchased.  It is essential 
for the DoD to develop a taxonomy for the deliverables in order to 
unveil true cost drivers and appropriate sourcing strategies to 
mitigate the cost drivers.  A study may be undertaken in the future to 
develop taxonomy of deliverables for acquiring knowledge-based 
services. 
3. Our study focused on five types of knowledge-based services in the 
context of the USAF.  Typically, the USAF has certain technological 
differences as compared to the other components of the DoD.  A 
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similar study for other components of the DoD may be undertaken to 
find additional shortcomings in the DoD acquisition process. 
F. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, this study examined the efficacy of sourcing knowledge-
based services in the USAF context while applying commercial sector best 
practices.  Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were undertaken in order to 
find inefficiencies in the USAF sourcing and finding for-profit sector best practices 
of strategic sourcing.  In brief, we found seven for-profit sector best practices that 
could bring savings to USAF if adopted in true spirit.  Some of the practices are 
difficult to implement due to socioeconomic factors and legal mandates; however, 
the USAF can implement them with fruitful results.  Based on the results of our 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, during this challenging time after the 
materialization of sequestration, the DoD needs to enhance the use of some of 
the commercial sector best practices in its acquisition. 
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APPENDIX A. FOR-PROFIT SECTOR INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. What are the different types of knowledge-based services being 
procured?    
2. How is your organization structured to manage the procurement of 
knowledge-based services? 
3. How many people manage your organization’s procurement of 
knowledge-based services?   
4. Does your organization specifically track the spend on knowledge-
based services? 
5. How do you control spending on knowledge-based services?  Are 
there policies that establish who is authorized to request or contract 
for these services?  Are there dollar-value based approval 
thresholds?   
6. What other strategies do you use to mitigate demand for these 
services (e.g., demand management)? 
7. Do you maximize competition when procuring these services?  Do 
you use sole-source contracts (i.e., not competed)? 
8. Do you use “should-cost” analysis?   
9. Do you use total cost analysis or strategic cost management?  
10. Knowledge-based services can be sensitive requirements since 
certain internal customers have strong ties to certain companies 
(e.g., consultants). How do you overcome or manage this?   
11. What metrics do you use to track the efficiency of the procurement 
of knowledge-based services? 
12. Do you evaluate a supplier’s record of or ability to reduce costs 
when evaluating suppliers during the source selection/tender 
process? 
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13. What incentives do you provide to suppliers of knowledge-based 
services to perform very well?   
14. What are your sourcing strategies for acquiring each of the different 
types of knowledge-based services? 
15. What is your preferred methodology regarding sourcing tacit / 
explicit knowledge-based services vis-à-vis insourcing / 
outsourcing?  Do you compare the cost of outsourcing/contracting 
vs. hiring and performing the services in-house prior to deciding to 
contract for the services?  
16. Are there any processes / IT systems in your organization to 
preserve / transfer the outcome of those knowledge-based services 
that are tacit? 
17. If your organization is spread across many locations and/or business 
units, how do you prevent multiple contracts for the same types of 
knowledge-based services?   
18. Do you have local, regional, or one central buying office to purchase 
knowledge-based services?   
19. If you prefer regional buying office, than what is your policy for 
covering different regions? 
20. In your organization, do you follow any peculiarly defined 
model/checklist while sourcing knowledge-based services? 
21. While contracting for knowledge-based services, what are the 
different outcomes/deliverables that your organization aims to 
achieve (e.g., technical report, research, staff support labor, 
education, training, analysis, expertise, advice, presentations, white 
paper, etc.)? 
22. Of the different outcomes of knowledge-based services, what are 
the major cost drivers of each by type?   
23. Do you think these cost drivers can be minimized?   
24. If so, how? 
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25. If yes, what are the policy hurdles in meeting the objective of cost 
minimization?  
26. From where do you discover the latest cost savings strategies/ideas 
(e.g., hire the best talent, attend conferences, trade publications, 
consultants, others)? 
27. Does your organization engage in supplier development for 
“bottleneck / strategic” knowledge-based services? 
28. Does your organization use electronic reverse auctions to procure 
knowledge-based services?   
29. What is your strategy regarding strategic partnership with your 
suppliers for knowledge-based services? 
30. In your organization, what is a typical duration for awarding a 
services contract? 
31. To achieve efficiency in sourcing knowledge-based services, what 
strategies are being practiced in your organization (e.g., spend 
analysis, demand management,  contract consolidation, reverse 
auctioning) 
32. What are the constraints, if any, of applying the best practices of 
strategic sourcing in your organization while acquiring knowledge-
based services? 
33. What is the spend ratio in your organization for acquiring services 
vis-à-vis supplies? 
34. Out of these services what is the approximate percentage of 
knowledge-based services? 
35. What is your preferred number of contractors for any specific 
services contract? 
36. For the purpose of awarding contracts, DoD uses either Fixed price, 
labor-hour, or Cost re-imbursement contracts. What is the preferred 
type of contract for knowledge-based services used by your 
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organization?  Do you essentially buy time (labor-hour) or do you 
specify deliverables? 




APPENDIX B. NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How do you categorize different types of knowledge-based 
services?  Why do you categorize them this way? 
2. How is your organization structured to manage the procurement of 
knowledge-based services?   
3. Does your organization specifically track the spend on knowledge-
based services? 
4. How many people manage your organization’s procurement of 
knowledge-based services? 
5. How do you control spending on knowledge-based services?  Are 
there policies that establish who is authorized to request or contract 
for these services?  Are there dollar-value based approval 
thresholds?   
6. What other strategies do you use to mitigate demand for these 
services (e.g., demand management)? 
7. Do you use “should-cost” analysis? 
8. Do you use total costs analysis or strategic cost management? 
9. What metrics do you use to track the efficiency of the procurement 
of knowledge-based services? 
10. How much savings has your organization realized from sourcing 
knowledge-based services in the past year?  What caused the 
savings? 
11. What are your sourcing strategies for acquiring each of the different 
types of knowledge-based services? 
12. What is your preferred methodology regarding sourcing tacit / 
explicit knowledge-based services vis-à-vis insourcing / 
outsourcing?  Do you compare the cost of outsourcing/contracting 
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vs. hiring and performing the services in-house prior to deciding to 
contract for the services?  
13. Is there any process in your organization to preserve / transfer the 
outcome of those knowledge-based services that are tacit? 
14. Within your region, how do you prevent multiple contracts for the 
same types of knowledge-based services?   
15. In your organization, do you follow any peculiarly defined 
model/checklist while sourcing knowledge-based services? 
16. Is any part of your process for sourcing knowledge-based services 
automated? 
17. While contracting for knowledge-based services, what are the 
different outcomes/deliverables that your organization aims to 
achieve (e.g., technical report, research, staff support labor, 
education, training, analysis, expertise, advice, presentations, white 
paper, etc.)? 
18. Of the different outcomes of knowledge-based services, what are 
the major cost drivers of each by type?   
19. Do you think that these cost drivers can be minimized?   
20. If yes, what are the policy hurdles in meeting the objective of cost 
minimization?  
21. Does your organization engage in supplier development for 
“bottleneck / strategic” knowledge-based services? 
22. Do you use electronic reverse auctions to procure knowledge-based 
services?   
23. Does your organization favor strategic partnership with your 
suppliers for knowledge-based services? 
24. In your organization, what is a typical duration for awarding a 
services contract? 
25. Do you feel that Government regulations like FAR / DFAR etc., are 
beneficial or hurdles in achieving better strategic sourcing? 
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26. If you think these are hurdles, then in your opinion, what are the 
alternatives for achieving efficiencies while maintaining or increasing 
effectiveness? 
27. What are the constraints, if any, of applying the commercial best 
practices of strategic sourcing while acquiring knowledge-based 
services? 
28. Do you think that Government buying activities should be given the 
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